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The Real Effects of Opacity: Evidence from Tax Avoidance 
 




This study provides evidence on a significant real consequence of an opaque 
financial reporting information environment: increased corporate tax avoidance.  Using 
an international sample of firms, I find that firms with a more opaque information 
environment, as measured at both the firm and country level, exhibit higher levels of 
firm-specific tax avoidance.  More importantly, additional tests using the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as an exogenous shock to the 
information environment while simultaneously controlling for tax regime changes 
around the date of IFRS adoption provide direct evidence on the direction of the 
association, namely that opacity causes tax avoidance.  Similarly, the results from tests 
using the initial enforcement of insider trading laws provide additional support for a 
directional hypothesis.  In support of the firm-level findings, I also find evidence in the 
aggregate that opacity is associated with countries collecting less corporate tax revenues 
as a percentage of gross domestic product.  In whole, these findings suggest that tax 
avoidance is a significant real effect of opacity with implications for practitioners, 
regulators, researchers, and tax-enforcement agencies.
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Tara, Adalyn, and Cecily, this one’s for you. 
1 Introduction
This study hypothesizes and finds evidence that increased corporate tax avoidance is a
significant real effect of financial reporting information opacity. On a practical process level
there are compelling reasons to believe that the opacity of a firm's information environment
will have an effect on tax avoidance. Implicit within each amount claimed as either an income
or deduction on the corporate tax return is the underlying economic activity and the revenue
or expense as reported by management in the financial report, both of which preceded it. As
all information available to investors and analysts is also available to tax-enforcing entities,
to the extent that the firm's financial information environment is opaque, the firm may be
better able to obfuscate its tax liability to government agencies and thus avoid more tax.
My findings are consistent with this explanation - that the direction of the association is
such that opacity leads tax avoidance.
Despite this intuitive link between information environment and tax liability, tax avoid-
ance as a real effect of opacity or opacity as a determinant of tax avoidance is largely
overlooked within the literature. Filling this gap is useful for at least two reasons. First, the
literature struggles to explain the cross-sectional differences in opacity given that opacity
hurts firm value (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003) and also still seeks to understand the overall
benefits and costs of financial opacity. One possible benefit, that may help to outweigh the
costs, is the ability of opaque firms to avoid taxation. Second, tax avoidance is a significant
global economic phenomenon. A recent study by the Tax Justice Network (2011) estimates
the size of tax evasion, where tax evasion is a lower bound for tax avoidance, at 5.1 percent of
global gross domestic product (GDP).1 Thus, providing evidence on a link between opacity
and tax avoidance can have important implications for both academic and policy debates.
1To put this in perspective, tax evasion is equal to 54.9 percent of worldwide healthcare expenditure, a
ratio only so low due to the USA having the highest healthcare costs and the highest GDP yet one of the
lowest tax evasion rates. In contrast, the unweighted average tax evasion to health care spending ratio is
110 percent meaning that, in most countries, tax evasion exceeds healthcare spending.
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Two recent working papers have begun to consider the relationship between opacity and
tax avoidance, but do so with mixed results and in stylized settings, leaving the question
open for additional study. First, Wang (2010) investigates tax avoidance in the context of
firm value and information opacity for S&P 1500 firms from 1994 to 2001 and finds that
opaque firms avoid less taxes than their transparent counterparts. Wang (2010) argues that
this negative association is a result of value-conscious corporate management. In contrast
to this, Balakrishnan et al. (2011) argue that tax aggressiveness causes increased corporate
organizational complexity, and therefore hypothesize that increased tax avoidance will lead
to a lower level of financial reporting transparency. Using a new measure of tax avoidance,
Balakrishnan et al. (2011) control for determinants of opacity and find a positive relationship
between tax avoidance and opacity for a sample of domestic-only firms. It should also
be noted here that, though they do not provide direct tests of the causal aspect of their
hypothesis, Balakrishnan et al. (2011) assume one direction of causality, while this study
hypothesizes and finds evidence consistent with the association running in the opposite
direction.
Along with these mixed findings, there is also tension outside the literature. First, though
it has been shown that firms attempt to guide analysts, the firm's information environment
is not entirely within the firm's control and even if it were there are still many countervailing
incentives (of which taxes may be one) that would affect a firm's decisions regarding trans-
parency. Second, to the extent that book and tax are linked and to the extent that firms
face incentives to manage earnings upward to meet analyst or market expectations, firms
may be unable to keep taxable income low while also meeting those expectations. Therefore,
whether and to what extent financial opacity affects firm-level tax avoidance remains largely
an unresolved and important empirical question.
To study the relationship between opacity and tax avoidance, I use an international
setting with a broad sample of cross-country market, financial, and analyst data. An inter-
national setting is particularly relevant to the research question due to the cross-sectional
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variation present in both the information environment and tax avoidance behaviors found
between countries and the firms domiciled within them. While an international setting has
the potential advantage of greater congruence between book and tax, this can also be a
disadvantage as incentives with higher order than tax may take precedence. In addition, the
recent adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by various countries
around the world as well as the initial enforcement of insider trading laws over the last few
decades allows for natural experiments using difference-in-difference analyses to test predic-
tions regarding the causal direction of the association. Finally, the use of an international
setting also allows for the study of tax avoidance in the aggregate by testing cross-sectional
differences in government-collected corporate tax revenues and how those revenues vary with
country-level measures of opacity.
I follow Bushman et al. (2004b) and define the opacity (transparency) of the financial
reporting information environment as the unavailability (availability) of firm-specific infor-
mation to those outside the firm. For parsimony, this construct is frequently referred to
simply as opacity. Conceptually, the construct opacity is the inability of outsiders to pierce
the cloud of the firm and see through to its underlying operations and activities. To mea-
sure firm-level opacity I use proxies for information uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
earnings quality commonly used in the literature, including: the absolute value of analysts'
forecast error, analysts' forecast dispersion, the average bid-ask spread, and performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals. In addition, country-level proxies of opacity include: an
index of corporate governance, an index of disclosure requirements, the extent of news me-
dia penetration, and the mandatory adoption of IFRS.
I define tax avoidance broadly as any activity, legal or otherwise, that reduces a firm's tax
liability per dollar of pre-tax earnings. This definition follows from such papers as Hanlon and
Heitzman (2010a) and is widely used in the literature. Firm-level tax avoidance is measured
using two different but complementary variables, namely the spread between the applicable
country-year statutory tax rate and either 1) the firm's cash effective tax rate (cash ETR)
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for the year, or 2) the firm's reported effective tax rate (reported ETR) for the year. Both
the cash and reported ETR are frequently used within the tax avoidance literature.
This study begins by extending the prior literature by testing the association between
opacity and tax avoidance in an international setting. The results of this first set of anal-
yses indicate that both firm- and country-level opacity are incrementally and significantly
associated with greater firm-level tax avoidance.2 Specifically, each of the four firm-level
opacity proxies is positively associated with tax avoidance, suggesting that tax avoidance
increases as opacity increases. In addition, tax avoidance is also positively associated with
a new summary opacity measure: an index score created from the four firm-level opacity
measures. Similarly, results from regressions using four country-level indicators of opacity
also show that country-level opacity is significantly associated with greater firm-level tax
avoidance and is incremental to firm-level opacity (as measured by the opacity summary
index measure). Since firms are less likely able to influence country-level opacity through
their individual tax avoidance activities, this is initial evidence that opacity may lead tax
avoidance.
The next tests directly investigate this preliminary evidence on the direction of the as-
sociation using firm-level data. Specifically, I test the directional hypothesis that an opaque
financial information environment has an effect that naturally leads and may potentially be
exploited by management to obfuscate the firm's tax avoidance activities to taxing authori-
ties. This analysis uses difference-in-difference regression models utilizing first, the adoption
of IFRS, and then second, the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, as an exogenous
shock to the financial reporting environment of the firm and tests how these shocks to opacity
affect tax avoidance. In tests using the adoption of IFRS, I also limit the treatment group to
exclude those countries with tax regime changes around the time of adoption to ensure that
the effect on tax avoidance is not confounded by coinciding changes to tax laws. The results
from both tests provide direct evidence consistent with opacity causing tax avoidance.
2These findings are consistent with the domestic, firm-level results of Balakrishnan et al. (2011).
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To further examine the relationship, I next interact opacity with IFRS adoption and
investigate the effect this interaction has on tax avoidance for those countries that maintained
their tax regime immediately before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. Results from this
test suggest that IFRS adoption attenuates the ability of firms to use opacity to avoid taxes
and is consistent with the argument that the reduction in tax avoidance due to IFRS adoption
is because of a decrease in opacity. Additionally, results from a lag analysis where the main
regression model is modified to include either lagged opacity or lagged tax avoidance show
that lagged opacity continues to have a significant and positive association with unlagged
tax avoidance, whereas the model using lagged tax avoidance and unlagged opacity fails to
find a significant association. The results of all these tests together strengthen the argument
that tax avoidance follows from the information environment facing the firm.
Further analysis presents evidence that the positive association between opacity and tax
avoidance is strengthened for firms with opportunities to extract private benefits. Financial
opacity is a logical mechanism to investigate the connection between rent extraction and tax
avoidance as both require some level of covertness, something that opacity can provide. These
tests follow from and provide new evidence to the observation made in Hanlon and Heitzman
(2010a) that the theory from Desai and Dharmapala (2006) that rent extraction3 and tax
avoidance require complementary technologies is an interesting angle and is underexplored.
Finally, the positive association between opacity and tax avoidance is robust to a wide
range of alternative specifications for the cash ETR and reported ETR and the summary
opacity index measure. In addition, the association is also robust to other model specifi-
cations and sample restrictions, including adjusting the sample to remove U.S. firms and
employing yearly cross-sectional (Fama and MacBeth 1973) regression models. The results
of all robustness tests remain qualitatively similar to the initial firm-level results.
3Rent extraction is defined broadly and includes a wide range of behaviors such as perquisite consumption,
otherwise excessive amounts of executive compensation (regardless of form), non-arms-length or related-party
transactions, and outright theft. In addition, earnings management, to the extent that it inflates stock price
and allows for insiders to take abusive action and extract gains, would also fall under this umbrella.
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This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways; first, by documenting
the robust, positive relationship between opacity and tax avoidance and extending these
findings to a sample of international firms; second, by establishing that country-level opacity
has an incremental effect to firm-level opacity on both firm-level tax avoidance and in the
aggregate with collected country-level corporate tax revenue as a percentage of GDP; third,
by presenting evidence showing that the association between opacity and tax avoidance is
strengthened for firms with opportunities to extract rents; and fourth, by providing direct
evidence that opacity has a causal association with tax avoidance by using two separate
exogenous shocks to opacity to show that tax avoidance decreases following those shocks. In
summary, the results suggest that opacity is a significant, yet overlooked, determinant of tax
avoidance and that the link between the two has important implications for practitioners,
regulators, researchers, and governmental tax-enforcement entities. In addition, the frictions
and market costs related to opacity and the tension between opacity and book-tax congruence
may help to explain the observation in Armstrong et al. (2012) that some firms appear to
engage in more conservative tax planning than might otherwise seem to be optimal.
This paper joins with others in answering the call in Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for
additional research that investigates the cross-sectional determinants of firm-level tax avoid-
ance and extends the body of literature by looking to the overall information environment
of the firm as a potential and important determinant of its tax avoidance activities. In addi-
tion, this paper joins a small, but growing body of international research that has sprung up
in recent years to investigate the incentives for tax avoidance across the globe by utilizing
country-specific variation (for examples, see Amiram et al. 2011 and Atwood et al. 2011).4
4Amiram et al. (2011) note that past tax avoidance research has focused mostly on classical systems
- that is systems where both the corporation and shareholders pay tax on the same income. Exploiting
country-specific imputation systems (which at least partially eliminate the double taxation of corporate
profits as found in the U.S.), they hypothesize and find that firms located in countries with imputation tax
systems have a weaker incentive to avoid taxes. Atwood et al. (2011) investigate various country-specific tax
structures including a worldwide taxing regime, required book-tax conformity, statutory corporate tax rates,
and the perceived level of tax enforcement and find that firms avoid less taxes when a worldwide approach is
used, required book-tax conformity is higher, statutory corporate tax rates are lower, and tax enforcement
is perceived to be stronger. However, upon further investigation they find that the relationship between tax
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical predictions
while providing an overview of the relevant literature. Section 3 details the research design.
Section 4 outlines the sample selection as well as presents the results of all significant tests.
Section 5 concludes and poses possible areas of additional inquiry.
2 Empirical Predictions
This study builds upon the intuition that a firm's economic activities are common to both
its financial and tax functions and that both the economic activity and financial reporting
occur prior to reporting for tax purposes. For example, when an economic activity occurs it is
first reflected within the management reporting system. This information is then packaged,
usually in several different ways depending on the intended audience and their needs, so that
it can be effectively reported to management, analysts, shareholders, and other users (e.g., a
firm's economic activities are translated through the lens of the local GAAP and then made
publicly available in its annual and quarterly financial statements). After these activities and
amounts have been used for financial purposes, they are then further subjected to tax laws
to produce filings suitable for tax authorities. This common process suggests that opacity
could be associated with tax avoidance for two reasons. First, although the information is
subjected to additional tax laws, it is often the case (especially in an international setting)
that a firm's tax amounts follow closely from its local GAAP amounts and thus opacity for
financial purposes directly precedes and contributes to opacity for tax purposes. Second,
all information that is available to investors and analysts is necessarily also available to
tax-enforcing entities such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Therefore, any activity
or amount that a firm wishes to obfuscate from tax authorities must, by necessity, also be
excluded from or obfuscated in its public disclosures.
avoidance and each of the four tax system characteristics is contextual and depends largely upon the variable
compensation of management.
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In addition, this study builds primarily upon two distinct streams of literature, namely
those of corporate transparency (the inverse of opacity) and tax avoidance. A large body
of research shows the market effects of corporate transparency in an international setting,
including Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Daske et al. (2008), and Lang et al. (2011). Specifically,
these studies show that greater financial transparency at the firm-level is associated with
lower bid-ask spreads and a greater level of liquidity. In addition, Francis et al. (2004)
and Francis et al. (2005) show that corporate financial reporting quality is an important
determinant of both the firm's cost of equity and its cost of debt. Also related, but in
a slightly different vein, is Bushman et al. (2004a). This study notes that organizational
complexity (where greater complexity is associated with reduced reporting transparency)
can hinder the efforts of investors to understand firm operations and value.
The impact of corporate transparency, however, is not limited to overall market con-
sequence. Corporate transparency can also serve a disciplinary role for corporate insiders
resulting in a better selection of investments, more efficient management of assets in place,
and a reduction in the expropriation of minority shareholders' wealth (see Bushman and
Smith 2001). This line of argument suggests that corporate transparency can also affect spe-
cific real corporate activities, of which tax avoidance is one. As an example of how opacity
may affect real activities, McNichols and Stubben (2008) examine whether firms with opaque
financial reporting also make suboptimal investment decisions and find that such firms tend
to over-invest. Following this line of thought, as the underlying economic transactions, ac-
cruals processes, and firm operations and structures become more opaque, tax avoidance
activities can more easily proliferate.
Increased tax avoidance being associated with opacity, however, is not a foregone conclu-
sion. Scholes et al. (2009) detail how managers face tradeoffs between financial reporting and
tax avoidance. These tradeoffs are often due to the conflicting motives that management has
to produce higher results for financial purposes, yet at the same time to minimize the firm's
tax liability. Especially in an international setting where the association between tax laws
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and the local GAAP is stronger than in a purely domestic one, economic transactions are
often reported in a similar fashion for both book and tax reporting purposes (e.g., income
or expense in period A for book purposes is also an income or expense in period A for tax
purposes), thereby limiting the degree to which these two numbers can be driven apart. To
the extent that financial reporting or market concerns outweigh tax concerns, and to the
extent that firms manage earnings to meet those concerns, then a firm's tax liability may
also increase as earnings are managed.
Notwithstanding, recent studies show that management has incentives for avoiding tax
and are often rewarded for doing so. For example, Rego and Wilson (2008) examine the
impact that executive compensation has on tax risk/aggressiveness and find that executive
compensation and tax aggressiveness are positively related. Further studies show that this
association reflects efficient contracting rather than a form of rent extraction. Using a pro-
prietary data set of detailed executive compensation, Armstrong et al. (2012) investigate
the pay-related incentives of the tax director and find a significant and negative relationship
between the tax director's level of compensation and the firm ETR. However, they fail to
find much of a relationship with any other tax-related variable, suggesting that tax directors
have an incentive to reduce the reported tax expense for financial statement purposes.5
While past studies exploited firm-specific characteristics as proxies for firm-level oppor-
tunities and incentives (see Zimmerman 1983 and Gupta and Newberry 1997)6, more recent
studies have looked to agency costs, managerial incentives, and corporate governance to ex-
plain a firm's level of tax avoidance (see Desai and Dharmapala 2006, Desai et al. 2007, and
Desai and Dharmapala 2009). For example, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find a negative
association between the level of tax sheltering and incentive compensation with the associa-
5Additional examples of recent studies involving agency costs, governance, and managerial incentives
include Desai et al. (2007) and Dyreng et al. (2010).
6Zimmerman (1983) looks at the relation between firm size and firm-level ETRs (as a component of polit-
ical costs) and finds evidence consistent with larger firms engaging in income-reducing accounting activities
in order to mitigate the increased government scrutiny they incur over smaller firms. However, using the
Tax Reform Act of 1987 (TRA), Gupta and Newberry (1997) find conflicting evidence that firm-level ETRs
are not associated with firm size when looking across longer horizons. Instead, they show that ETRs are
related to capital structure, asset mix, and firm performance both before and after the TRA.
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tion being mostly driven by firms with weak corporate governance. They argue that through
the use of incentive-based compensation, managerial incentives are better aligned with those
of shareholders and that these high-powered incentives reduce agency costs by discouraging
management from participating in activities that would otherwise involve rent extraction.
To the extent that the agency cost view of tax avoidance predominates, then opacity,
under the guise of less transparent accounting and financial reporting and a lower level of
coverage by information intermediaries, may create a shield under which managerial oppor-
tunism thrives leading to increased tax avoidance. Under this point of view, one would expect
a positive association between opacity and tax avoidance. However, prior research also shows
that information transparency allows outsiders to better monitor managerial activities and
discretion (see Lang et al. 2004), which includes the tax function. Therefore, if tax avoidance
is value-enhancing and management communicates this through transparency, then trans-
parency may instead be associated with increased tax avoidance. Under this alternative view
there would be a negative relationship between opacity and tax avoidance. Finally, to the
extent that both of the above effects exist and neither predominates (or the effects cancel
out one another), then an empirical analysis should lead to no discernible association.
This study begins by relying upon the agency cost theory of tax avoidance and by testing
the intuition that a firm's economic activities are common to both its book and tax functions
and by seeking to clarify the mixed findings of the prior literature. Therefore, the first
hypothesis is as follows:
H1: Opacity, at both the firm and country level, is associated with increased
firm-level tax avoidance.
This hypothesis also leads to predictions for country-level aggregate tax avoidance (as op-
posed to firm-level tax avoidance). Since corporate tax revenues collected by a country are
the sum of individual firm-level taxes paid, and to the extent that opacity is associated with
tax avoidance at the firm-level, the hypothesis and association should continue to hold when
investigating opacity and taxes collected at the country-level.
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H1 above hypothesizes about the association between tax avoidance and opacity. How-
ever, it also leads to questions about the direction of this association as the intuition and
theory behind the hypothesis is that opacity creates an environment that management can
exploit to obscure taxes and reduce the firm's tax liability. An international setting pro-
vides a laboratory-like setting for testing the causal direction of this association. Starting
December 31, 2005, countries began mandating the adoption of IFRS, including many EU
countries, Australia, and New Zealand. Several studies have shown that IFRS, when com-
pared to many local GAAPs, provides more extensive measurement and disclosure rules,
along with many capital market benefits, accounting property improvements, and a positive
effect on analysts' ability to forecast future earnings (see Ding et al. 2007, Bae et al. 2008,
Daske et al. 2008, Byard et al. 2011, and Landsman et al. 2012). Due to the adoption of
IFRS within a country being outside the firm's control, as well as the improvement in the
information environment that accompanied such adoption, I use the mandatory adoption of
IFRS as an exogenous shock to opacity. To the extent that tax avoidance follows opacity and
to the extent that IFRS adoption was not also accompanied by a change to the country's tax
regime, it follows then that IFRS adoption will lead to a decrease in tax avoidance for those
firms in countries that experienced the shock relative to those that did not. However, to
the extent that tax avoidance leads to opacity, there should be no such effect post adoption.
This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards, an exogenous
shock to the information environment, decreased the tax avoidance activities of
the firm relative to non-adopters and the pre-adoption period.
This second hypothesis is notable for its prediction in regard to the flow of information
between book and tax. Prior literature shows that both book and taxable income provide
information to investors and market participants (see Hanlon and Heitzman 2010b) with
many studies finding that book-tax differences are informative as to the growth and persis-
tence of firm-level earnings (see Lev and Nissim 2004 and Hanlon 2005) and that taxable
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income has information content incremental to book income such that book-tax conformity
may reduce the amount of beneficial information available to the marketplace (see Han-
lon et al. 2005 and Atwood et al. 2010). This vein of literature implies that tax expenses
and book-tax differences are informative due to their ability to capture an element of some
underlying and broadly defined earnings quality or earnings management behavior. This
second hypothesis, however, stands apart from these previous studies by predicting that the
effect from the flow of information between financial and tax may also run in the opposite
direction.
Similar to H2 above, I also construct a hypothesis in regards to the enforcement of
insider trading laws: that the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, an exogenous shock
to the information environment, decreased the tax avoidance activities of the firm relative to
countries without such enforcement and the pre-enforcement period. Prior literature suggests
that, following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, analyst following increased,
analysts began forecasting a broader set of measures, and that financial reporting quality
improved (see Bushman et al. 2005, Hail 2007, and Zhang and Zhang 2012). Thus, the initial
enforcement of insider trading laws is another potential exogenous shock to the information
environemtn with which I can test whether an improvement in information transparency
precedes a reduction in tax avoidance.
Finally, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) suggest that rent extraction and tax avoidance
may require additional technologies. Financial information opacity is a particularly com-
pelling mechanism for which both rent extraction and tax avoidance may exist due to the
complementary environment it provides for both. Indeed, to the extent that tax avoidance
and rent extraction occur and to the extent that they rely on the same organizational and
transactional structures, an opaque information environment would be an ideal setting in
which management would be able to pursue both simultaneously. This leads to the third
and final hypothesis:
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H3: Opacity provides the firm and its management the joint opportunities and
processes necessary to engage in both rent extraction and tax avoidance.
3 Research Design
To test the empirical predictions, I estimate a series of pooled OLS regressions of the following
general form:
TaxAvoidi,t = γ0+ γ1Opacity Characteristicsi,t+β1Controlsi,t+FixedEffects+ εi,t (1)
where Opacity Characteristics is the primary variable of interest, the proxies and measure-
ment of which are described in detail, along with TaxAvoid and Controls, in the following
sections. In addition, standard errors are clustered by firm and year (see Gow et al. 2010)
to account for possible correlation in residuals. To reduce the undue influence of outliers,
all firm-level continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile of their
respective distributions.
3.1 Measuring firm-level opacity
Because opacity is inherently difficult to measure, I use the following five separate indicators
as proxies for the availability of firm-specific information: analysts' forecast error, analysts'
forecast dispersion, performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as calculated in Kothari
et al. (2005) and Frank et al. (2009), the average bid-ask spread, and a summary opacity
index score based upon the other four measures.7 Higher values of each measure of opacity
correspond to higher levels of opacity.
The first analyst-based measure, ForErr, is calculated as the absolute value of the most
recent analysts' mean earnings per share (EPS) forecast less the actual EPS for the year,
7A detailed description of the measurement of all variables can be found in the Appendix.
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both from I/B/E/S, scaled by the firm's stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. The
most recent analysts' mean EPS forecast used in the calculation is the last analysts' forecast
prior to the actual EPS. Similarly, the second analyst-based measure, ForDisp, is calculated
as the dispersion of analysts' forecasts scaled by the firm's stock price at the beginning
of the fiscal year. Both ForErr and ForDisp have been shown to be related to greater
transparency in the firm's information environment and reflect the ability of outsiders to the
firm to process firm-related information (see Lang and Lundholm 1996 and Jin and Myers
2006). In addition, it follows intuitively that as a firm become more opaque (i.e., further
limits the avialability of firm-specific information) that those analysts following the firm will
have a reduced ability to forecast that firm's important financial measures, such as earnings.
Therefore, analyst forecast error and dispersion will increase.
The third measure follows Kothari et al. (2005) and Frank et al. (2009) and is a mea-
sure of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, or DiscAcc. This measure calculates
discretionary accruals based on the modified-Jones model (per Dechow et al. 1995) with
performance-matching based on Francis et al. (2005). An extensive literature in accounting
shows that firms with earnings that exhibit greater levels of earnings management are more
likely to have a lower quality accounting and therefore exhibit greater opacity. In addition,
this measure has been used to capture financial reporting aggressiveness (see Frank et al.
2009) and has been shown in a domestic sample to be related to the level of discretionary
permanent differences.
The fourth measure of firm-level opacity is the natural logarithm of the average bid-ask
spread, BidAskSpr, and follows Anderson et al. (2009). Due to data limitations regarding
intra-day detail for the international sample, the bid-ask spread used here as simply the
natural logarithm of the average of the daily spread. The bid-ask spread is a measure of
information uncertainty and relates to the inability of market participants to agree upon
a price for the firm's equity offerings. Finally, an overall measure of firm-level opacity is
constructed as an index based upon the four firm-level opacity measures. This opacity
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index, OScore, increases in value by one for each of the four firm-level opacity measures that
is above the sample median and thus takes a value ranging from 0 to 4.
3.2 Measuring country-level opacity
In addition to firm-level measures of opacity, I also investigate the association between tax
avoidance and four country-level measures of opacity. The first country-level opacity variable
is the governance disclosure measure from Bushman et al. (2004b), Governance. Bushman
et al. (2004b) show that the quality of a country's corporate governance infrastructure, and
its required disclosures about this infrastructure, are an important determinant of corporate
reporting transparency. As with all the country-level measures, and opposite to the firm-level
opacity measures, higher values of Governance correspond to lower levels of opacity (higher
levels of transparency).
The second country-level opacity measure, Disclosure, is the financial disclosure require-
ments as reported by La Porta et al. (2006). La Porta et al. (1997) document that indicators
of the country-level required disclosure intensity are important determinants of a firm's
information environment. The third measure, MediaPen, follows Maffett (2011) and is a
measure of the extent that news media have penetrated a country. Bushman et al. (2004b)
show that the lack of a well-developed media communication infrastructure limits the flow
of firm-specific information to interested parties, which increases information opacity.
The final measure, PostIFRS, is an indicator variable for country-years that have man-
dated the use of IFRS. Many studies within the accounting literature (see Hail and Leuz
2009) have shown that the use of a well-developed international form of GAAP, such as
IFRS, can have beneficial effects on the overall quality of a firm's information environment.
3.3 Measuring tax avoidance
I define tax avoidance as any activity, legal or otherwise, that reduces a firm's tax liability per
dollar of pre-tax earnings. This definition conforms closely to others used in the literature
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(see Hanlon and Heitzman 2010a), and follows directly from Frank et al. (2009) which defines
tax aggressiveness as the downward manipulation of taxable income through tax planning
that may or may not be considered fraudulent tax evasion.8 Thus, for purposes of this
study, tax avoidance is not strictly limited to those activities that are legal, but may also
include otherwise abusive or illegal transactions.9
There are several proxies for tax avoidance that have been used in the literature, in-
cluding: reported effective tax rate, cash effective tax rate, temporary book-tax differences,
permanent book-tax differences, and operations in jurisdictions labeled as tax havens. Due
to data restrictions of the international sample, I calculate measures based upon the reported
and cash effective tax rate only. To be able to calculate many of the alternative measures of
tax avoidance, such as the level of book-tax differences or operations in tax havens, would
require data that is unavailable for a large portion of the sample and thus require that
those observations be dropped, severly shrinking the sample size and limiting the power of
statistical tests.10
To calculate the measures of tax avoidance I follow Amiram et al. (2011) and use the
spread between the enacted corporate statutory tax rate (CSTR) and the cash effective
tax rate, CETRSpr, as well as the spread between the enacted CSTR and the reported
effective tax rate, ETRSpr. More positive spreads of both the cash ETR and ETR relative
8Although this definition is broad and widely accepted, not all studies define tax avoidance this way.
For example, Rego (2003) defines tax avoidance as only those activities which legally reduce a firm's tax
payments while Desai and Dharmapala (2006) define it as synonymous with abusive tax sheltering.
9Forms of illegal or abusive tax avoidance often used within the literature include three separate concepts
of tax evasion, tax noncompliance, and tax sheltering. Tax evasion is used to refer to those tax reporting
activities which, if discovered, would lead to civil or criminal sanctions (see Crocker and Slemrod 2005). Tax
noncompliance refers to corporate income tax which is justly due but goes unpaid to the taxing authority
(see Slemrod 2004). Lastly, tax sheltering refers to often complex transactions and tax loopholes which
are marketed and sold to corporations, often by accounting or legal firms, for the sole purpose of reducing
corporate tax liabilities (see U.S. GAO October 21, 2003 and Hanlon and Slemrod 2009). Tax shelters
often involve the manipulation of many different parts of the tax code and are, by their very nature, varied,
sophisticated, and difficult to both measure and detect.
10Financial statement data is not as readily available in Datastream Advanced Database as it is in other
datasets such as Compustat. Examples of missing tax-related data necessary for the calculation of other
measures of tax avoidance, such as book-tax differences, include domestic income, state, local, and other
taxes, and tax loss carryforwards.
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to the benchmark of the corporate statutory tax rate are assumed to imply more firm-level
corporate tax avoidance.
Both the unbenchmarked cash and reported effective tax rates are widely used as mea-
sures of tax avoidance within the literature for domestic settings. Using the corporate statu-
tory tax rate as an adjusting benchmark to calculate the spread of both rates has the ad-
vantage of implicitly controlling for unobserved time-varying country-level characteristics
present in an international setting that may not otherwise be controlled for through fixed
effects. In addition, cash ETR measures have the benefit of being less sensitive to country-
specific financial accounting standards, whereas measures using the reported effective tax
rate does not have that advantage.
The measurement of CETRSpr is based upon the cash ETR constructs used in Dyreng
et al. (2008). Dyreng et al. (2008) calculate the cash ETR over a five-year period to study
those firms that consistently pay less in corporate taxes. However, due to data restrictions
that would substantially reduce the size of the sample and country representation if I were
to calculate the measure over a five-year period, the calculation of CETRSpr here is limited
to include only a single year. Specifically, CETRSpr is defined as the corporate statutory
tax rate of the country in which the firm resides less that firm's annual cash ETR, where
cash ETR equals the cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax income adjusted for discontinued
operations and extraordinary items.
While the cash ETR measures the cash paid to taxing authorities, prior research shows
that investors, and thus management, focus on earnings over cash (see Sloan 1996). There-
fore, I also use the spread between the reported effective tax rate and the statutory rate since
the reported ETR more directly impacts a firm's earnings (in juxtaposition to the cash ETR
which uses cash taxes paid) on which a company and its management are likely to focus.
ETRSpr is calculated as the difference between the firm's annual ETR and the CSTR of
the country in which it is domiciled, where ETR equals the income tax expense for the year
divided by pre-tax income adjusted for discontinued operations and extraordinary items.
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In addition to the above two measures, I also test the robustness of the results against
a number of alternative specifications using the CSTR and firm-specific tax rates, including
the ratio of the annual firm-level rates (cash ETR or reported ETR) to the CSTR, labeled
CETRSca and ETRSca, respectively. Unlike the spread measures, higher ratios are assumed
to imply less corporate tax avoidance relative to the statutory benchmark. In addition,
each of the cash ETR and reported ETR proxies is calculated without adjusting pre-tax
income for discontinued operations and extraordinary items resulting in four more measures,
CETR2Spr, CETR2Sca, ETR2Spr, and ETR2Sca. Lastly, I also calculate the cash ETR
and reported ETR without first difference or scaling by the CSTR and use the measures in
models both with and without the CSTR as an additional control variable.
3.4 Control variables
Consistent with prior studies in the tax avoidance literature, I include an extensive list of
additional variables to control for factors other than opacity that are likely to be associated
with tax avoidance (see Gupta and Newberry 1997, Rego 2003, Dyreng et al. 2008, Frank
et al. 2009, and Wilson 2009). The rationale behind including these controls is to capture
the extent to which firms may be limited in their ability to either decrease taxable income
or increase tax credits. A detailed description of the calculation of each control variable can
be found in the Appendix.
The first control is the presence of a Big-5 auditor, Big5, and is included as the tax
avoidance activities of firms audited by a Big-5 auditor are likely to be different from those
audited by others for two potentially conflicting reasons. First, firms often use the same
accounting firm for tax consultant services as they do for audit services, meaning that firms
employing a Big-5 auditor are also likely to have access to more sophisticated tax avoidance
techniques. However, and in opposition to that, due to the increased scrutiny of a Big-5 audit,
the tax provision and its generating processes are also likely to undergo an increased level
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of scrutiny. Therefore, the coefficient on Big5 may be either positive or negative depending
upon which effect dominates.
As a potential measure of tax sophistication, I include a measure for firm age, Age.
Firms that have been established for longer are also more likely to have more advanced tax
policies in place as well as having more refined tax avoidance behaviors. Following Amiram
et al. (2011) I also include firm-level return on assets, RoA, and leverage, Lev, measures to
control for the increased incentives and opportunities that both profitable firms and firms
with greater leverage (or complex financing arrangements) have to avoid taxes. Size, the
natural logarithm of assets, is a control for the influence that firm size may exhibit upon
the tax function and has been shown to be related to tax avoidance in Zimmerman (1983).
Additionally, prior studies suggest that operations in foreign jurisdictions may give the firm
an increased opportunity to avoid taxes and so an indicator variable to control for firms
with foreign operations, ForOps, is included as a measure for the presence of foreign-based
income. In addition, the book-to-market ratio, BM, is a control for the growth opportunities
of the firm as firms with stable growth may avoid more tax on average.
Following Bauer (2011), I also control for the potential constraint a firm has on its cash
flows (CFConstrnt) and for consecutive accounting losses (AggLoss). Firms with poor perfor-
mance are likely to have fewer financial resources available to allocate to their other functions
and therefore are likely to allocate fewer resources to their tax function in comparison to
firms without similar constraints. Thus, these firms are likely to pay tax at a rate much
closer to the country-specific statutory tax rate as they instead focus on returning to prof-
itability rather than on tax avoidance activities. Intang and RnD control for the intensity
of intangibles and research and development, respectively. Firms with high levels of intangi-
ble assets and intellectual property may be able to shift those assets and income-producing
activities more easily to foreign jurisdictions and thus be able to exploit the lower statutory
rates of other tax regimes. However, these variables are also likely to have different treat-
ment for book and tax purposes (see Chen et al. 2010), leading to a possible ambiguity in
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their relationship to tax avoidance. Similar to the control for intangible assets, PPE controls
for the effect of tangible assets. Because PPE and RnD are expected to generate large tax
deductions which would work to decrease the tax base, both are expected to be associated
with lower taxes relative to the corporate statutory tax rate benchmark.
Additionally, prior research has shown that firms with a U.S. American Depositary Re-
ceipt have greater transparency due to a higher level of institutional holdings (see Lang
et al. 2003). To the extent that the financial reporting environment of the firm influences
its tax avoidance activities, it is likely that firms cross-listed in the United States will also
have different tax payment tendencies than firms domiciled in the same jurisdiction but not
cross-listed in the United States. Therefore, ADR controls for firms that choose to cross-list
in the U.S. during each period.
Finally, prior research shows that deferred taxes vary across industries (e.g., Lev and
Nissim 2004 and Hanlon 2005). Therefore, I include industry fixed effects for each two-digit
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) industry. The ICB is an industry classification
taxonomy created by Dow Jones and the FTSE Group and is used globally to divide the
market into increasingly specific and well-defined sectors and subsectors. In addition to
industry fixed effects, I also include fixed effects for both the year and home country of the
firm in the event that tax avoidance varies across both time or location as well as to control
for otherwise unobserved year and country characteristics.
4 Sample and Results
Firm-level fundamental and financial variables are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datas-
tream Advanced Database. More specifically, firm-level financial data is taken from World-
scope and market data from Datastream. Analyst-related data is obtained from the In-
stitutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S ). In addition, country-level data regarding
statutory tax rates is collected from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
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opment (OECD) website or, where necessary, by hand. I use all firm-year observations with
necessary data between the years 1993 and 2008. The analysis begins in 1993 due to the
general lack of tax-related data on Worldscope prior to that time. In addition, the analysis
is stopped at 2008 due to the global changes related to the escalating financial and housing
crises occurring at that time and resulting austerity measures imposed by various countries.
Because lagged variables, such as total assets, are used in the measurement of variables, the
year 1993 is essentially eliminated from the analysis. After eliminating all observations that
lack the necessary data to construct all variables, the final sample includes 71,652 firm-year
observations for the least restrictive model, though the sample size for each individual test
may be less due to additional data restrictions.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The composition of the sample by country is shown in Table 1. This table presents char-
acteristics for country-level opacity variables, corporate statutory tax rate, and IFRS and
imputation years. As seen, the sample includes 42,199 firm-year observations with enough
data to estimate the least restrictive model using CETRSpr and 71,652 firm-year observa-
tions with enough data to estimate the least restrictive model using ETRSpr. The difference
in number of observations between CETRSpr and ETRSpr is the result of less data availabil-
ity in Worldscope for cash taxes paid (WC04150) in comparison to total income tax expense
(WC01451). Both samples include 30 countries with broad variation in enacted policies,
information environment, and corporate statutory rates. An advantage of this international
sample is that it is not dominated by the largest most heavily followed firms and, as a result,
contains a substantial number of firms for which opacity issues are likely more pronounced.
The United States is the most represented country with either 37.1 (CETRSpr) or 35.9
(ETRSpr) percent of the sample domiciled within its borders. Japan and the United King-
dom make up the next largest with 18.1 (CETRSpr) or 13.1 (ETRSpr) and 15.8 (CETRSpr)
or 12.9 (ETRSpr) percent, respectively. In addition, a few other European countries and
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Australia also see modest gains in representation in the cash ETR sample as compared to
the reported ETR sample. Additional details regarding the country composition of a specific
subsample used in a main test can be found in the country composition panels preceding
that test.
Table 2, Panels A and B presents a summary of firm-level descriptive statistics. Panel A
shows descriptive statistics for the least restrictive models using CETRSpr, while Panel B
shows descriptive statistics for the least restrictive models using ETRSpr. These statistics
are particularly useful when determining the economic significance of subsequent regression
coefficients. Both CETRSpr and ETRSpr have mean and median values greater than zero,
indicating that the average firm both expenses and pays tax at a rate less than the corporate
statutory rate. A comparison between the two panels shows slight differences in sample char-
acteristics with the cash ETR sample containing firms that are, on average, slightly older,
larger, and more profitable. Overall, however, the firms appear comparable across samples
with both containing a diverse group of firms, ranging from small to large, old and young,
with a broad representation of profitability, growth opportunities, investment decisions, and
information environment. Similar to the country composition panels, additional details re-
garding the summary statistics of a specific subsample used in a main test can be found in
the summary statistic panels preceding that test.
Table 3, Panel A presents a correlation matrix of variables of interest with Pearson
correlations reported below the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal based
upon the most restrictive model using listwise deletion. A similar correlation matrix can be
found in Table 3, Panel B, which reports the Pearson correlations for the least restrictive
model using pairwise deletion. Most of the firm- and country-level opacity measures are
significantly correlated in both panels, suggesting that they capture a shared underlying
economic construct. In addition, most of the opacity measures are correlated with the




4.2.1 Tax avoidance and firm-level information opacity
The first hypothesis predicts that the magnitude of tax avoidance is increasing in the opacity
of the financial reporting environment. Table 4 presents the results for the tests of this
prediction using five different measures of firm-level information opacity. In addition, Table
4 also contains panels detailing the country composition and summary statistics used for
each subsample. Column (5) of Panels A and B shows results for OScore, a new summary
index measure that, as noted in the Appendix, is calculated by adding one to the score
when each of the four opacity measures is above its sample median and thus ranges from
0 to 4. Panel A shows results using the cash ETR spread as the dependent variable while
Panel B uses the reported ETR spread. In addition, Panel C reports results where the
sample is limited to include those firms with requisite data for calculation both CETRSpr
and ETRSpr. Country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model, thus
allowing each regression to explicitly focus on firm-level opacity and how its variation within
a particular country, industry and year relates to tax avoidance. In Panels A and B the
coefficient for every measure of opacity is both significant and positive, indicating that as
opacity increases, so too does tax avoidance as measured by CETRSpr and ETRSpr.
Further investigation of Panel A shows that the effect appears to be particularly strong
for cash taxes paid, as all five measures of information opacity are significant at the 1-percent
level for the cash ETR spread. The results in Panel B continue to be significant and in the
expected direction but are slightly weaker in statistical significance. This may be due to
the greater diversity of accounting rules and increased noise in the reported ETRs for an
international sample. In general, the coefficients on the other variables are also significant
and consistent across models, signifying that tax avoidance is associated with higher leverage,
book-to-market, lower cash flow constraints, lower intangibles, and greater property, plant,
and equipment (PP&E), and research and development (R&D) intensities. In addition,
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Panel A shows that return on assets, firm age, and size are all positively associated with
increased tax avoidance as measured by the cash ETR spread, whereas Panel B shows that
Big-5 auditor, return on assets, and size are all negatively associated with an increase in
the ETR spread. These findings are consistent with earlier findings within the literature
regarding the ambiguity between certain firm fundamentals and tax avoidance. In addition,
Panel C shows that each opacity measure is statistically significantly in relation to the cash
ETR spread, whereas the results where the reported ETR spread is the dependent variable
are weaker. This follows the general trend seen in Panels A and B.
Overall, the results of Table 4 on tax avoidance and firm-level opacity support the hy-
pothesis that tax avoidance is increasing with more opaque financial reporting environments
and help to clarify the mixed results of earlier studies.
4.2.2 Tax avoidance and country-level information opacity
The prior analysis controlled for country-level fixed effects and showed a positive association
between tax avoidance and financial opacity. However, firm-level tax avoidance likely also
depends on country-level opacity. The next analysis provides further tests of the empirical
predictions through the use of four country-level opacity measures.11 The inclusion of the
firm-level summary opacity measure, OScore, in each model as an additional control variable
means that the effect of the country-level opacity measures are incremental to the firm-level
effect.
In addition to test results, Table 5 also contains panels detailing the country composition
and summary statistics used for each subsample. Table 5, Panel A shows results for the
four country-level variables on the cash ETR spread. The results of Columns (1) through
(4) are unambiguous in showing that as country-level opacity increases, as measured by an
index of governance, an index of disclosure, the level of media penetration, and the manda-
11These tests also have the advantage that the determinants of country-level opacity are (largely) out of the
firm's control. Therefore, this limits the possibility that the documented associations are due to endogeneity,
self-selection, or some other unobservable firm-level characteristic.
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tory adoption of IFRS, firm-level tax avoidance decreases and that the effect is incremental
to firm-level opacity (which continues to be significant and positively associated with tax
avoidance). The country-level opacity results are significant at the 1-percent level for all
measures. Similar to the firm-level regressions, increased tax avoidance is also associated
with return on assets, size, cash flow constraints, PP&E and R&D intensities though results
for leverage, book-to-market, and intangibles are weaker.
Table 5, Panel B shows results of the test using the reported ETR spread as the dependent
variable. The results of Columns (1) through (4) also find that each of the country-level
opacity measures continues to be significantly related to the reported ETR spread, though
the significance of OScore is attenuated. This is in line with the firm-level findings in regard
to the results being weaker for the reported ETR spread than for the cash ETR spread.
4.2.3 Directional tests of opacity and tax avoidance
The analyses thus far have shown that both firm- and country-level opacity are associated
with firm-level tax avoidance. The next analysis performs tests on the direction of this
association as formalized in the second hypothesis. These tests rely upon the idea that
financial reporting opacity serves as a shield behind which management is able to avoid taxes
and is a test of a directional hypothesis, namely that tax avoidance follows opacity. To test
the direction of the association I estimate difference-in-difference regression models using the
mandatory adoption of IFRS as an exogenous shock to the financial reporting environment.
The adoption of IFRS led to standards that, when compared to local GAAPs, are more
capital-market oriented and provide more extensive measurement and disclosure rules (see
Ding et al. 2007 and Bae et al. 2008). Several studies have also shown that IFRS adoption
is associated with benefits to capital markets, improvements of accounting properties, and
more precision in analysts' ability to forecast earnings (see Daske et al. 2008, Byard et al.
2011, and Landsman et al. 2012). The dependent variable is the cash ETR spread because,
while the change to IFRS would likely also affect the calculation of tax expense for financial
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reporting purposes, a firm's cash payments made to government agencies (to the extent
that the tax regime remains unchanged) should not be. Of additional concern is that the
period of IFRS adoption also saw some of the adopting countries making similar changes
for tax purposes. In this scenario, IFRS adoption would be a shock to both opacity and
tax avoidance as measured through cash taxes paid and would therefore be unsuited for the
difference-in-difference tests as an exogenous shock.12
To relieve this concern, I first determine tax regime changes for each country around the
date of IFRS adoption. For a vast majority of the world, taxable profit is based upon the
legal-entity (or statutory) accounts since the consolidated company does not exist as a legal
entity against which taxes are assessed (see Ng 2009). Therefore, I isolate those countries
where IFRS adoption was not accompanied by a shift in the tax regime by looking at the
accounting rules governing statutory accounts for each country. To determine the tax regime
and the accounting standards used for statutory accounts for the sample of countries, I rely
upon two sources of data, the Planned implementation of the IAS Regulation (1606/2002) in
the EU and EEA as provided by the European Commission and both the 2009 and 2011 ver-
sions of IFRS adoption by country provided by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. The Planned
implementation of the IAS Regulation (1606/2002) in the EU and EEA, shows the proposed
and final laws in place prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS regarding whether the coun-
try's statutory accounting will also change or be allowed to change to IFRS post adoption.
To the extent that information regarding the final laws is not available from the European
Commission document, the findings are supplemented with the information contained in
12Christensen et al. (2012) show that the market liquidity effects previously documented as relating to the
adoption of IFRS are actually dominated by changes to reporting enforcement as countries began proactively
reviewing financial statements. Using the changes to reporting enforcement here, however, is problematic for
many reasons. First, the findings of Christensen et al. (2012) are in regard to the market liquidity benefits of
IFRS adoption and not the overall information environment (which includes analysts, earning quality, etc.).
While market liquidity is an aspect of information opacity, it is not the focus of this paper. Second, of the
ten countries that Christensen et al. (2012) report as initiating the proactive review of financial statement,
only eight are represented in the sample here, five of which bundled the change in enforcement with IFRS
adoption, making it difficult to differentiate between the two events. Furthermore, only two countries with
changes in enforcement also retained their tax regimes, drastically dropping the power of potential tests.
Finally, to the extent that the overall opacity shock is actually attributable to reporting enforcement and
not IFRS adoption, then that should only bias against finding results using IFRS adoption.
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IFRS adoption by country, first from the 2009 document and then, when necessary, from the
2011 document. Since it is unlikely that the statutory accounts would change to IFRS and
then immediately back to local GAAP, I am confident in relying upon these two documents
even though they weren't published until many years after IFRS was adopted.
The details regarding country-level tax regimes and statutory accounting are summarized
in Table 6. As expected, the vast majority of countries use statutory accounting for tax
purposes with the tax regime classified as being quasi-dependent.13 Only five countries have
tax regimes classified as independent and only Luxembourg is classified as dependent. In
addition, of the 18 countries classified as quasi-dependent and that mandate the adoption
of IFRS for consolidated purposes during the sample period, nine do not allow IFRS for
statutory accounts, eight permit the use of IFRS for statutory accounts with only New
Zealand requiring its use for statutory accounts. The treatment group for the difference-in-
difference analyses is selected as: 1) those countries that have adopted IFRS, and that 2)
have either an independent or quasi-dependent tax regime. Furthermore, for those countries
classified as a quasi-dependent tax regime, I require 3) that IFRS be not permitted for
statutory accounting purposes. These requirements leave 11 countries that adopt IFRS for
financial purposes but have no change in either the tax regime or the accounting for statutory
accounts.14
In addition, Table 15 provides the change in both the corporate statutory tax rate and
the personal statutory tax rate for all countries which adopted IFRS for the three years
13Per IFRS adoption by country, there are three types of tax regimes: dependent, quasi-dependent, and
independent. A dependent tax regime refers to those countries where taxable profit is based on the legal-entity
statutory accounts with only limited deductions. Quasi-dependent refers to those countries where taxable
profit is principally based on the legal entity statutory accounts with a number of adjustments provided in
the tax law. Independent refers to those countries where taxable profit is determined in accordance with a
specific set of tax rules with little or no direct reliance on the legal entity statutory accounts of the company.
14Of note here is that some firms and countries had concerns prior to IFRS convergence on the potential
direct impact such convergence might have on firms' tax liabilities. For example, in 2008, subsequent to
adopting IFRS for financial purposes, Spain shifted to a modified Spanish GAAP for tax purposes but
passed legislation around the same time in an attempt to ensure that firm-level tax liabilities would not
change pre- and post-change. The results of the tests presented here imply that even despite the efforts
of such legislation, there may still be an indirect effect on tax avoidance as firms are less able to hide tax
avoidance strategies in the more transparent environment.
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surrounding IFRS adoption. As is seen there, the adoption to IFRS for most countries did
not also include include a change in the tax rate, with only two of the eleven treatment
countries having any noticeable change in the CSTR from the year immediately prior IFRS
adoption to the year of IFRS adoption. Of these two, Austria experience the greatest change
by lowering its CSTR by 9 percentage points. Denmark was the second country and lowered
its rate by 2 percentage points. These findings further reinforces the belief that for these
countries the adoption of IFRS did not include a change in tax regime.
To test the direction of the association, I perform pooled OLS regressions of the following
form:
TaxAvoidi,t = γ0 + γ1Adopteri,t + γ2PostY earsi,t + γ3Adopteri,t ∗ PostY earsi,t+
β1Controlsi,t + Fixed Effects+ εi,t (2)
where Adopter takes a value of one for firms domiciled in one of the 11 countries chosen
according to the three criteria above and zero otherwise. PostYears takes a value of one for
all fiscal years ending after the IFRS adoption date, December 31, 2005, and zero otherwise.15
Due to Adopter and PostYears both being linear combinations of country or year fixed effects,
respectively, the model above is also restricted to include only the interaction term. To the
extent that tax avoidance follows opacity, tax avoidance will be reduced post-IFRS adoption
for the sample of firms in those 11 countries relative to tax avoidance both pre-adoption and
for those firms domiciled in other countries. However, to the extent that the direction of
the association runs opposite and that opacity leads tax avoidance, there will be no such
effect on tax avoidance. The variable of interest that captures this effect is γ3. A coefficient
on γ3 different from zero is interpreted as signifying that opacity has a differing impact on
15I focus only on the December 31, 2005, IFRS adoption period and exclude the January 1, 2008, IFRS
adoption by Israeli firms for the following reasons: first, only a handful of Israeli firms are represented at the
later date; and second, due to the sample period only extending to 2008, I am unable to do a full post-IFRS
analysis for the Israeli firms that adopted IFRS at the later date.
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tax avoidance for the 11 countries identified as IFRS adopters but not tax regime changers
after IFRS adoption versus tax avoidance before IFRS adoption and for other countries.
Specifically, I expect a negative sign on γ3 when using CETRSpr as the dependent variable.
Due to the exogenous nature of IFRS adoption without tax regime changes, this implies that
opacity leads tax avoidance.
The results of this test can be found in Table 7. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 7 report
results where the dependent variable is CETRSpr, and Columns (2) and (4) report results
where the dependent variable is CETRSca for robustness. In all models the interaction term
γ3 is significant and in the expected direction (i.e., -0.042 and -0.043 for models where the
dependent variable is CETRSpr and 0.118 and 0.121 for those using CETRSca), suggesting
that increased tax avoidance does indeed follow from increased opacity. In addition, neither
Adopter nor PostYears is significantly different from zero on its own. This suggests that
the reduction in tax avoidance is not due to some inherent country- or time-related charac-
teristic but is because of the shock to opacity experienced by these 11 countries post-IFRS
adoption. In addition, Table 7, Columns (5) through (8) report robustness results of these
tests. Columns (5) and (6) report results using a random selection of 11 countries as IFRS
adopters that did not also change tax regimes while Columns (7) and (8) report results using
a randomly selected year as the mandatory IFRS adoption year. Due to IFRS adoption oc-
curing at a single time for the countries in the sample, these additional tests help to ensure
that the results are not spurious. As is seen in Columns (5) through (8), γ3 is insignificantly
different from zero in all four specifications, lending further support to the argument that
the adoption of IFRS for the 11 countries identified in Table 6 was a shock to opacity and
that this shock led to a reduction in tax avoidance.
As is seen in Table 1, the U.S. is a large part of the sample. Since US GAAP is generally
of higher quality than the local GAAPs found in other countries (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000),
the inclusion of U.S. firms in the control sample in the above tests may be inducing a bias in
the results of those tests. Therefore, to ensure the robustness of the results, I next exclude the
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U.S. from the control group. As is seen in Table 7, Columns (9) and (10), the results continue
to be very statistically significant, with the coefficients on the interaction terms continuing
in the desired directions (-0.055 and 0.155 for CETRSpr and CETRSca, respectively) and
both significant at the 5-percent level. These results reinforce those found above and further
strengthen the causal argument.
To further test the association, I use a difference-in-difference design for the one year
immediately before and after IFRS adoption and interact the firm-level summary opacity
measure, OScore, with the interaction of PostYears and Adopter (termed PostAdopter) where
PostAdopter is again equal to one for those firms in the 11 countries that have adopted IFRS
but had no change to the tax regime in the year after IFRS adoption and equal to zero
otherwise. This test is performed to determine whether the association between opacity and
tax avoidance changes post-IFRS adoption for those 11 countries in the treatment sample.
Limiting the analysis to the years immediately before and after adoption focuses on the effect
that IFRS adoption has on the ability of firms to use opacity for tax avoidance. As is seen
in Table 8, Columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on OScore remains significant and in the
expected direction with a value of 0.025 for CETRSpr and -0.071 for CETRSca. This implies
that opacity continues to be positively associated with tax avoidance for all firms during
those years. Of particular importance, however, is the interaction term between OScore
and PostAdopter, which is significant at the 1 percent level with a coefficient of -0.017 and
0.051 for CETRSpr and CETRSca, respectively. This differential effect pre- and post-IFRS
adoption implies that the ability of the firms in those 11 countries to use opacity to avoid
taxes is attenuated by the exogenous shock to opacity of IFRS adoption and bolsters the claim
that tax avoidance follows financial opacity. Lastly, but also of interest, is the coefficient on
PostAdopter, which is not significant. This is consistent with the reduction in tax avoidance
occurring due to the decrease in opacity and not through some alternative channel related to
other changes that might have occurred at the time of IFRS adoption. This is expected, as
the firms located in countries that could opportunistically change their tax regime to reduce
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taxes paid at the time of IFRS adoption are excluded from the treatment group. This is
in contrast to Ng (2009) that uses a sample of firms in the United Kingdom, where firms
were able to choose whether to change their statutory accounts over to IFRS, to show that
firms that are able to choose to change their tax regime did so due to accounting regulation
differences that resulted in the firm paying less in taxes. Indeed, as seen in Table 8, Column
(3), where PostAdopter is changed to PostIFRS and now includes all countries that adopted
IFRS after IFRS adoption (and thus includes countries where firms can opportunistically
choose their tax regime), the coefficient on PostIFRS is positive and significant, reinforcing
the findings of Ng (2009) that firms that are permitted to change their tax regime to IFRS
may do so to gain a tax advantage.
As a second exogenous shock that has an impact on the information environment of a
firm, I use the initial enforcement of newly introduced insider trading laws. Bhattacharya
and Daouk (2002) show that the first prosecution of insider trading laws have an impact on
capital market participants and result in lower costs of equity for the country. Consistent
with this, evidence suggests that analyst following increases, analysts forecast a broader set
of measures, and that financial reporting quality improves upon the restriction of insider
trading (see Bushman et al. 2005, Hail 2007, and Zhang and Zhang 2012). In addition,
Hail et al. 2012 show that firms rely less on dividends as a means of signaling their type
following the information environment improvement associated with a country's enforcement
of insider trading laws. Thus, the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, in addition to
IFRS adoption, is associated with improvement to the information environment and, as a
country-level event, is largely exogenous from the individual firm.
Table 9 shows the results of the tests using the initial enforcement of insider trading
laws. Since the enforcement of insider trading laws had no broader financial accounting
ramifications, the tests here use both the cash effective and reported tax rate spreads and
ratios as dependent variables. In addition, since the initial enforcement of insider trading
laws should have no direct impact on the reported tax expense or cash taxes paid by a firm,
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I don't need to limit the treatment group as I did for the tests using the adoption of IFRS.
Therefore, the variable IT Enforcement takes a value equal to one for every year after the first
year that insider trading laws were enforced for each country that enforced insider trading
laws. As is seen in each of the Columns (1) through (4), the coefficient on IT Enforcement
is significant and in the expected direction, implying that tax avoidance decreased for the
firm following the enforcement of insider trading laws in the country where it was domiciled
relative to tax avoidance before enforcement and for countries with no enforcement. These
findings help and strengthen the earlier findings in regard to IFRS adoption as an exogenous
shock and bolster the claim that opacity leads tax avoidance.
As an additional test, I also perform a simple lead/lag analysis using lags of both opacity
and tax avoidance. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 13, Columns (1) and
(2). As is shown in that table, lagged opacity continues to be significantly and positively
associated with current tax avoidance (coefficient of 0.019 and significant at the 1-percent
level), whereas lagged tax avoidance loses all association with current opacity. In whole, the
above tests and their results bolster the claim that the direction of the association between
firm-level opacity and tax avoidance is indeed one where opacity leads tax avoidance.
4.2.4 Rent extraction, opacity, and tax avoidance
The next set of tests turns to the third hypothesis, that financial opacity provides a com-
pelling setting in which the activities of rent extraction and tax avoidance may occur. These
tests look at managerial opportunistic behaviors. The results of these test are shown in
Table 10, Columns (1) through (4).
To capture the opportunities for private benefits extraction, I construct both a firm- and
country-level proxy. Following Amiram and Owens (2011), private benefits extraction is
defined broadly to include activities such as empire building, rent extraction, and expropria-
tion.16 For a firm-level measure I use the percentage of closely-held shares of the corporation
16The conceptualization of private benefits is summarized in Tirole (2001) as "[Insiders] may collect private
benefits by building empires, enjoying perks, or even stealing from the firm by raiding its pension fund, by
32
and define an indicator variable, PBOpp_F, that is equal to one if the firm has a percentage
of such shares above the sample median and zero otherwise. Additionally, for a country-level
measure I rely upon the anti-self dealing index as supplied by Djankov et al. (2008) and
construct a second indicator variable, PBOpp_C, that is equal to one if the anti-self dealing
index for the country is in the bottom quartile of all countries, and zero otherwise. Using
these measures, I then estimate pooled OLS regression models of the following form:
TaxAvoidi,t = γ0 + γ1Opacityi,t + γ2PBOppi,t + γ3PBOppi,t ∗Opacityi,t+
β1Controlsi,t + Fixed Effects+ εi,t (3)
where PBOpp captures either the firm- or country-level opportunities for the extraction of
private benefits (PBOpp_F and PBOpp_C, respectively) as measured above and Opacity
is measured by the firm-level summary opacity measure, OScore.
As is seen in Table 10, Columns (1) and (2), OScore continues to remain significant and
in the expected direction (positive for CETRSpr and negative for CETRSca). Of particular
note, though, is the coefficients on the indicator variable for PBOpp_F and the interaction
effect between opacity and opportunities for private benefit extraction. The coefficient on the
indicator variable is -0.034 and is significant at the 1 percent level. This finding is interesting
because it implies that as opportunities for private benefits extraction increase, tax avoidance
actually decreases. This effect, however, is attenuated by the interaction effect which shows
a significant coefficient of 0.009, implying that increased tax avoidance is associated with
increased opacity and an increase in opportunities for benefits extraction.
Although less strong, the results of Columns (3) and (4) also provide evidence on the
interaction between rent extraction, opacity, and tax avoidance. While the coefficients on
paying inflated transfer prices to affiliated entities, or by engaging in insider trading. Last, they may entrench
themselves by investing in mature or declining industries that they are good at running, by taking risk that
is either excessive (as when their position is endangered) or insufficient (as when it is secure), or by bending
over backwards to resist a takeover."
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the indicator variable alone lose significance, the interaction effect in both models remains
significant and in the predicted direction. This finding bolsters the earlier, firm-level findings.
In summary, the findings of Table 10 extends the theory of Desai and Dharmapala (2006) by
showing that opacity is an important factor when considering the association between tax
avoidance and rent extraction.
4.2.5 Collected tax revenues
This final analysis tests the association between country-level opacity and aggregate tax
avoidance. Analyses at the aggregate have the advantage of being less prone to potential
issues involving endogeneity. In addition, an analysis in the aggregate helps to move past
the potential firm-level data limitations by testing whether the relationship between opacity
and tax avoidance holds for all corporations within a country instead of for only the sample
of those public firms covered by Worldscope, I/B/E/S, etc.
The variable used for aggregate tax avoidance is CTaxRevGDP, and is defined as the
corporate tax revenues collected by a country as a percentage of its GDP. The requisite
data for CTaxRevGDP is collected from the OECD website and smaller (larger) values are
interpreted to mean that firms avoid more (less) taxes in the aggregate. In addition, I follow
Atwood et al. (2011) and include the following country-level variables that are likely to affect
tax revenues as collected by central governments: the enacted corporate statutory tax rate,
CSTR; the presence of a worldwide taxation system, Worldwide; book-tax conformity, Book-
TaxConf ; country-level earnings volatility, EarnVol ; the civil versus common law, CivCom;
anti-director shareholder rights, AntiDirRights ; and ownership concentration, OwnCon. In
addition, I also include the country-level opportunities for the extraction of private benefits
from the pervious analysis, PBOpp_C, as a measure of management opportunity and incen-
tives for tax avoidance. Similar to Amiram and Owens (2011), I assume that an environment
with high (low) opportunities for extraction is characterized by light (severe) punishment if
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the manager is caught extracting private benefits. All control variables are defined in the
Appendix.
Results of this test can be found in Table 11. All four country-level opacity measures
continue to load in the expected direction (i.e., higher levels of transparency relate to more
corporate tax revenues collected). However, only three of the variables are statistically
significant (MediaPen has a coefficient of 0.029 but a t-stat of only 1.26). Of particular
note is the significant and positive coefficient on PostIFRS (set equal to one for years post
adoption for those countries that mandated the use of IFRS, zero otherwise), which shows
that countries that have enacted IFRS collect, on average, more in tax revenues taken as
a percentage of GDP than do other nations. This bolsters the earlier tests and findings
concerning the effect of IFRS on tax avoidance and in particular, the directional effect of
opacity on avoidance.
As a final test, I include a new variable, Imput, which is set equal to one for country-years
where a full imputation system was in place and zero otherwise. Under a full imputation
system, shareholders receive credits for the amount of corporate taxes that the corporation
pays, thus eliminating the double taxation of corporate earnings. The result of this is
that corporate tax avoidance under an imputation system simply shifts the burden to the
shareholders; it does not reduce the overall tax burden. The positive coefficient on Imput
shows that countries with imputation system collect more in tax revenues, implying that
firms have less incentive to avoid taxes in those jurisdictions. This finding supports the
findings of Amiram et al. (2011).
The significance of the control variables varies across each model, but in general, higher
collected corporate tax revenues are associated with countries with higher book-tax con-
formity, worldwide taxation systems, lower earnings volatility, and a low (high) threat of
private benefits extraction (punishment). These findings are consistent with Atwood et al.
(2011), though with some conflicting evidence in regard to the corporate statutory tax rate.
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Intuition might dictate that as the corporate tax rate increases, so too would tax revenues -
however, so too do management incentives to avoid taxes (see Desai et al. 2007).
4.2.6 Firm-level robustness
Lastly, I evaluate the robustness of the association between opacity and tax avoidance against
alternative specifications of tax avoidance. The results of these tests are presented in Table
12.
As described above, the first measure used to evaluate the robustness of the main results is
the ratio of the cash ETR or reported ETR to the applicable corporate statutory rate (similar
to Amiram et al. 2011). Along with the tax rate spread, tax rate ratios help control for
unseen time-varying country-level characteristics by being benchmarked against the CSTR.
In contrast to the tax rate spreads, however, greater tax rate ratios imply a lower degree of
tax avoidance. As seen in Table 12, Columns (1), (3), (4), and (6), OScore is significantly
and negatively associated with each tax rate ratio. In support of the earlier findings, this
implies that opacity is positively associated with tax avoidance.
The measures of tax avoidance used in this study thus far have been calculated to adjust
for the effect of special and extraordinary items, though this adjustment is often not per-
formed in the literature. Thus, as another robustness measure calculates, I the cash ETR
and reported ETR as the ratio of cash taxes paid and tax expense, respectively, to pre-tax
income without any adjustments. Regression models that use this second alternative include
Table 12, Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6). As is seen, the results in Columns (2) and (3) con-
tinue to be highly significant and in the expected direction, though the results in Columns
(5) and (6) are slightly attenuated with Column (6) being insignificantly different from zero.
These weaker results when using measures based upon the reported ETR are consistent with
the earlier findings in Table 4. Given that Column (6) is the only specification that loses
significance, the results appear to be robust to alternative measurements.
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As mentioned earlier, the use of rate spreads and ratios is relatively new to the literature,
so as an additional robustness check I use the cash ETR and reported ETR without first
differencing or scaling by the corporate statutory tax rate. Similar to the tax rate ratios,
greater unadjusted rates are interpreted to imply a lower degree of tax avoidance. In addition,
I estimate a model of these unadjusted rates that also includes the country-level statutory
rate as an additional control. This alternative specification continues to control for the
country-level statutory rate but allows the coefficient on CSTR to take a value different than
one. Regression models that use these unadjusted rates can be found in Table 12, Columns
(7), (8), (9), and (10). Again, the results of these tests show no qualitative difference to the
original results.
Next, I perform a series of additional robustness tests. First, as seen in Table 1, U.S.
firms outnumber firms of any other country, which may be inducing a bias in the results.
Therefore, I test all main firm-level results while excluding the U.S. from the sample. The
results of this test can be found in Table 14, Panels A and B. Similar to the results found in
Table 3 which include the U.S., the results for models that use the reported ETR spread are
generally weaker than the results which use the cash ETR spread. In fact, as shown in Panel
A, all five proxies for opacity continue to load positively and significantly (with DiscAcc and
OScore significant at the 1-percent level, all others at the 5-percent level). As discussed
above and seen in Table 7, Columns (9) and (10), the results of the tests for causalty are
also robust to the exclusion of the U.S. from the sample.
Finally, the results are also robust to: 1) estimating yearly, cross-sectional models as
performed in Fama and MacBeth (1973), 2) excluding the bid-ask spread from the firm-level
summary opacity measure, OScore, 3) measuring OScore as the principal components of a
principal component analysis of the four proxies for opacity, and 4) measuring OScore as
the principal components of a principal component analysis of the three proxies excluding
the bid-ask spread.17 The results of each of these robustness tests can be seen in Table 13,
17Due to the bid-ask spread being more market-driven, it is excluded from both OScore and the principal
component analysis to focus more on financial statement information opacity.
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Columns (3) through (6), respectively. All coefficients of interest for these additional tests
are positive (ranging from 0.012 and 0.018) and significant at the 1-percent level.
5 Conclusion
While the prior literature has shown that tax-related information has information content
for investors and market participants in regard to firm-level earnings growth, earnings persis-
tence, earnings quality, and earnings management, it has shown little in regard to the effect
that financial reporting information and market intermediaries have upon the tax-related
activities of the firm. In addition, less is known about the potential real effects that opacity
may have upon tax avoidance behaviors. Using cross-country data, I find evidence consis-
tent with opaque firms engaging in more tax avoidance. As can be reasonably expected, this
effect is even more pronounced for firms located in countries with weaker governance and
lower levels of disclosure, and when other channels of acquiring corporate-level information
are restricted. These results hold for a broad range of tax avoidance proxies and in many
alternative specifications.
In difference-in-difference analyses using the mandatory adoption of IFRS while control-
ling for tax regime changes around the time of adoption, I find direct evidence consistent
with a causal relationship between opacity and tax avoidance, namely that opacity leads tax
avoidance. Additional tests using of the enforcement of insider trading laws as a second ex-
ogenous shock to the information environment provide additional support that opacity leads
tax avoidance. I also find evidence that opaque firms with opportunities to extract private
benefits engage in increased levels of tax avoidance. These finding hold using proxies for
both firm- and country-level opportunities for private benefit extraction. Lastly, I present
evidence in the aggregate that country-level collected tax revenues are negatively associated
with country-level opacity. Together these findings contribute to a more complete under-
standing of the real effects of opacity on tax avoidance and suggest that previous models of
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tax avoidance may be omitting an important variable from consideration. In addition, the
market frictions and costs related to opacity and the tension between opacity and book-tax
congruence may help to explain the puzzle in the literature of why some firms appear to
engage in more conservative tax planning than might otherwise appear optimal.
The findings of this study raise questions for additional areas of inquiry and further re-
search. Particularly, the strong association between analyst measures and tax avoidance
imply that analysts may not fully understand the complexities of taxation and that opacity
can further compound to hinder the analyst's ability to accurately capture tax-related infor-
mation in the forecast of earnings. Further research will be needed to determine the extent
of this potential bias and under what circumstances analysts do or do not fully impound the
effect of tax into their forecasts. In addition, the results of H3 suggest that opacity is an
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Variable Name Variable Definition and Data Source
Dependent Variables
CETR Cash Effective Tax Rate: Calculated as taxes paid (WC04150) divided by [pre-tax
income (WC01401) less discontinued operations (WC04054) & extraordinary items
(WC04225)]. Set to missing if denominator is less than or equal to zero.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
ETR Reported Effective Tax Rate: Calculated as the total income taxes (WC01451)
divided by [pre-tax income (WC01401) less discontinued operations (WC04054) &
extraordinary items (WC04225)]. Set to missing if denominator is less than or
equal to zero.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
CSTR Combined Corporate Statutory Tax Rate: Calculated as reported by source.
Includes both central and applicable sub-central government tax rates.
Source: www.oecd.org and hand-collected.
CETRSpr Cash Effective Tax Rate Spread: Calculated as the difference between the
applicable CSTR for the firm and its CETR.
CETRSca Cash Effective Tax Rate Scaled: Calculated as the ratio of the firm's CETR and
the applicable CSTR.
ETRSpr Effective Tax Rate Spread: Calculated as the difference between the applicable
CSTR for the firm and its ETR.
ETRSca Effective Tax Rate Scaled: Calculated as the ratio of the firm's ETR and the
applicable CSTR.
CETR2Spr Alternative measure of CETRSpr : Calculated as the difference between the
applicable CSTR for the firm and an alternative measure of CETR, calculated as
taxes paid (WC04150) divided by [pre-tax income (WC01401).
CETR2Sca Alternative measure of CETRSca: Calculated as the ratio of the firm's alternative
measure of CETR [calculated as taxes paid (WC04150) divided by [pre-tax income
(WC01401)] and the applicable CSTR.
ETR2Spr Alternative measure of ETRSpr : Calculated as the difference between the
applicable CSTR for the firm and an alternative measure of ETR, calculated as
total income taxes (WC01451) divided by [pre-tax income (WC01401).
ETR2Sca Alternative measure of ETRSca: Calculated as the ratio of the firm's alternative
measure of ETR [calculated as total income taxes (WC01451) divided by [pre-tax
income (WC01401)] and the applicable CSTR.
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CTaxRevGDP Country-level variable for government collected tax revenues as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According to www.oecd.org, the ratios are
calculated by expressing total corporate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP at
market prices.
Source: www.oecd.org.
Experimental Variables - Firm
ForErr Analysts' Forecast Error: Calculated as the absolute value of the mean analyst
forecast from I/B/E/S less the actual earnings as reported in the I/B/E/S
Summary file divided by the market price (Datastream item P) at the end of the
previous fiscal year.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream and I/B/E/S.
ForDisp Analysts' Forecast Dispersion: Calculated as the dispersion in forecasts
immediately before the end of the fiscal year from I/B/E/S divided by the market
price (Datasteam item P) at the end of previous year.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream and I/B/E/S.
DiscAcc Discretionary Accruals: Performance-matched modified-Jones model discretionary
accruals calculated following Kothari et al. (2005) and Frank et al. (2009).
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
BidAskSpr Average Bid-Ask Spread: Calculated as the log of the average of the daily bid-ask
spread for the fiscal year. The daily bid-ask spread is calculated as the asking
price (Datastream item PA) less the bid price (Datastream item PB) divided by
the midway-point between the two.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
OScore Opacity Score: Calculated from the four opacity measures of ForErr, ForDisp,
DiscAcc, and BidAskSpr. The OScore for a firm increases by one for each of the
four measures that is above the sample median and thus ranges between 0 and 4.
PBOpp_F Firm-level opportunities of private benefits extraction: An indicator variable set
equal to one if the firm's percentage of closely held shares (WC05475) as a
percentage of ordinary shares outstanding (NOSH) is greater than the sample
median, and zero otherwise.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
Experimental Variables - Country
Governance Country-level index variable for governance as reported in Bushman et al.
(2004b). Higher scores correspond to better governance and greater transparency.
Disclosure Country-level index variable for disclosure as reported in La Porta et al. (2006)
and Bushman et al. (2004b). Higher scores correspond to better disclosure and
greater transparency.
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MediaPen Country-level index variable for media penetration as reported in Bushman et al.
(2004b) and Maffett (2011). Constructed using World Bank's World Development
Indicators, in which each country is ranked based on the number of newspapers,
internet connections, and televisions per capita. Higher scores correspond to
better media penetration and greater transparency.
PostIFRS Country-level indicator variable equal to one if the country mandates the use of
IFRS during the year, and zero otherwise.
PostAdopter Country-level indicator variable equal to one if the country is one of 11 that
mandates the use of IFRS during the year but keeps its tax regime unchanged,
and zero otherwise. Also the interaction between PostYears and Adopter . Criteria
used is to select the countries as Adopter are: 1) those countries that mandate the
adoption of IFRS and that 2) have either an independent or quasi-dependent tax
regime. Furthermore, for those countries classified as having a quasi-dependent
tax regime, require that 3) IFRS be not permitted for statutory accounting
purposes after IFRS adoption for consolidated purposes.
Source: Planned implementation of the IAS Regulation (1606/2002) in the EU
and EEA (2005), European Commission; and IFRS adoption by country (2009 &
2011), PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
PBOpp_C Country-level variable for the opportunities of private benefits extraction based
upon the Anti-Self Dealing Index as reported in Djankov et al. (2008). Set equal
to one when a country has an index score in the bottom quartile of all countries,
and zero otherwise.
Control Variables
Big5 Big 5 Auditor: An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is audited by a
Big-5 auditing firm, and zero otherwise.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream and hand-collected.
Age Firm Age: Calculated as the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years
[company fiscal-year end date (WC05350) less Datastream item BDATE divided
by 365].
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
RoA Return on Assets: Calculated as pre-tax income (WC01401) less extraordinary
income divided (WC04225) by lagged total assets (WC02999).
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
Lev Leverage: Calculated as total long-term debt (WC03251) divided by lagged total
assets (WC02999).
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
Size Firm size: Calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets (WC03251).
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
ForOps Foreign Operations: An indicator variable set equal to one if foreign income
(WC07126) for the firm is non-missing and non-zero, and zero otherwise.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
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BM Book-to-market ratio: Calculated as opening common equity (WC03501) divided
by opening market capitalization (WC08002).
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
AggLoss Aggregate Losses: An indicator variable set equal to one if the sum of earnings
before extraordinary items and dividends (WC01551) for both the current and
prior fiscal years are less than zero, and zero otherwise.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
CFConstrnt Cash Flow Constraint: Calculated as one minus [net cash flow from operations
(WC04860) divided by lagged total assets (WC03251)].
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
Intang Intangibles: Calculated as intangible assets (WC02649) divided by lagged total
assets (WC03251).
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
PPE Property, Plant, and Equipment: Calculated as capital assets (WC02501) divided
by lagged total assets (WC03251).
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
RnD Research and Development: Calculated as R&D expense (WC01201) divided by
lagged total assets (WC03251).
Source: Worldscope/Datastream.
ADR American Depositary Receipt: An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm
trades on a U.S. exchange during the year, and zero otherwise.
Source: Worldscope/Datastream and hand-collected.
BookTaxConf Country-level variable for conformity between book and tax income as reported in
Atwood et al. (2011). Higher scores correspond to greater conformity between
book and tax.
Imput Country-level indicator variable for imputation treatment of dividends. Set equal
to one if the country has a full imputation system for the year, and zero otherwise.
Source: www.oecd.org.
Worldwide Country-level indicator variable for the presence of a worldwide taxation system
as reported in Atwood et al. (2011). Set equal to one if the country has a
worldwide tax system in place, and zero otherwise.
EarnVol Country-level variable for earnings volatility as reported in Atwood et al. (2011).
Higher scores correspond to greater volatility.
CivCom Country-level index variable for civil versus common law as reported in La Porta
et al. (1998). Set equal to one if the country has a civil law system in place, and
zero otherwise.
AntiDirRights Country-level index variable for anti-director (investor) rights as reported in
La Porta et al. (1998). Higher scores correspond to less (more) director-
(investor-) related rights.
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OwnCon Country-level index variable for concentration of ownership as reported in
La Porta et al. (1998) as the average percentage of common shares owned by the
three largest shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 42,199 0.025 0.398 -2.578 0.078 0.534
ETRSpr 42,196 0.040 0.258 -1.099 0.017 1.065
ForErr 42,199 0.019 0.145 0.000 0.003 0.176
ForDisp 33,577 0.009 0.077 0.000 0.002 0.062
DiscAcc 35,074 0.000 0.155 -0.620 0.000 0.673
BidAskSpr 26,889 -4.892 1.155 -7.171 -4.897 -2.244
Disclosure 41,964 93.769 8.488 59.060 100.000 100.000
MediaPen 25,909 90.001 5.577 77.000 92.000 97.000
Governance 41,964 81.254 8.938 65.580 76.810 96.740
PostIFRS 42,199 0.164 0.370 0.000 0.000 1.000
BookTaxConf 38,494 0.352 0.264 0.031 0.130 0.875
Big5 42,199 0.447 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 42,199 2.480 0.860 0.203 2.576 3.671
RoA 42,199 0.111 0.096 0.003 0.085 0.505
Lev 42,199 0.186 0.204 0.000 0.133 0.976
Size 42,199 14.019 2.349 9.625 13.715 20.424
ForOps 42,199 0.349 0.477 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 42,199 5.476 18.552 -0.051 0.509 104.961
AggLoss 42,199 0.055 0.228 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 42,199 0.893 0.104 0.527 0.905 1.150
Intang 42,199 0.163 0.236 0.000 0.058 1.215
PPE 42,199 0.332 0.285 0.003 0.266 1.314
RnD 42,199 0.023 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.234
ADR 42,199 0.022 0.148 0.000 0.000 1.000
ETRSpr 71,652 0.112 0.325 -1.124 0.045 1.720
ForErr 71,652 0.048 0.253 0.000 0.005 0.842
ForDisp 53,354 0.019 0.140 0.000 0.003 0.205
DiscAcc 43,332 -0.001 0.165 -0.707 0.000 0.699
BidAskSpr 44,580 -4.691 1.182 -7.171 -4.690 -1.941
Disclosure 71,241 92.997 9.392 59.060 100.000 100.000
MediaPen 42,744 88.435 6.340 73.000 91.000 97.000
Governance 71,241 79.770 9.286 65.580 75.720 96.740
PostIFRS 71,652 0.145 0.352 0.000 0.000 1.000
BookTaxConf 65,823 0.348 0.267 0.031 0.130 0.875
Big5 71,652 0.400 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 71,652 2.345 0.874 0.180 2.432 3.640
RoA 71,652 0.039 0.186 -0.806 0.054 0.461
Lev 71,652 0.180 0.211 0.000 0.117 1.081
Size 71,652 13.803 2.542 8.990 13.478 20.595
ForOps 71,652 0.287 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 71,652 6.227 20.708 -0.159 0.540 122.885
AggLoss 71,652 0.228 0.419 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 71,652 0.936 0.150 0.553 0.927 1.595
Intang 71,652 0.151 0.231 0.000 0.047 1.263
PPE 71,652 0.312 0.294 0.002 0.233 1.383
RnD 71,652 0.031 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.412
ADR 71,652 0.024 0.153 0.000 0.000 1.000
Table 2: Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Cash ETR Spread
Panel B: Reported ETR Spread
This table presents descriptive statistics for corporate tax avoidance, information opacity, and all controls as 
included in regression analyses. Variable definitions follow those as detailed in the Appendix. The descriptive 
statistics are based upon data for the years 1993 through 2008 and with data sufficient to estimate the least 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B: Least Restrictive M
odel
T
his tables presents pairw
ise correlations of variables used in prim
ary analyses.  Panel A
 show
s pairw




ber of observations to 12,822 (listw
ise 
deletion).  Panel B
 show
s pairw
ise correlations for the least restrictive m
odel, thus each correlation varies in its num
ber of observations (pairw
ise deletion).  For both panels, Pearson correlation coefficients are 
below




an correlation coefficients above the line. C
orrelations that are significant at the 5 percent level are in bold. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AUSTRALIA 1,789          1,446          1,547          1,229          879             
AUSTRIA 208             176             42               111             17               
BELGIUM 220             193             34               217             24               
CANADA 1,660          1,377          1,428          610             415             
CHILE 156             83               58               10               1                 
DENMARK 543             444             158             514             123             
FINLAND 514             456             237             496             212             
FRANCE 842             705             688             821             549             
GERMANY 1,125          940             842             1,093          659             
GREECE 320             257             73               4                 -              
HUNGARY 94               78               -              52               -              
IRELAND 357             316             6                 227             5                 
ISRAEL 106             68               35               32               6                 
ITALY 294             265             148             236             96               
JAPAN 7,650          5,406          7,542          6,946          4,687          
LUXEMBOURG 48               37               -              30               -              
MEXICO 31               26               11               16               6                 
NETHERLANDS 625             558             225             474             166             
NEW ZEALAND 364             343             26               343             24               
NORWAY 453             391             177             436             137             
POLAND 139             121             20               132             11               
PORTUGAL 192             161             11               158             -              
SOUTH KOREA 11               13               2                 9                 2                 
SPAIN 202             182             13               197             13               
SWEDEN 829             681             501             584             306             
SWITZERLAND 860             769             520             826             452             
TURKEY 250             194             76               262             56               
UNITED KINGDOM 6,653          4,665          6,444          6,347          4,134          
UNITED STATES 15,664        13,367        14,577        4,732          3,493          
42,199        33,718        35,441        27,144        16,473        
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance
Country Mix for Panel A
54
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 42,199 0.025 0.398 -2.578 0.078 0.534
ForErr 42,199 0.019 0.145 0.000 0.003 0.176
Big5 42,199 0.447 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 42,199 2.480 0.860 0.203 2.576 3.671
RoA 42,199 0.111 0.096 0.003 0.085 0.505
Lev 42,199 0.186 0.204 0.000 0.133 0.976
Size 42,199 14.019 2.349 9.625 13.715 20.424
ForOps 42,199 0.349 0.477 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 42,199 5.476 18.552 -0.051 0.509 104.961
AggLoss 42,199 0.055 0.228 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 42,199 0.893 0.104 0.527 0.905 1.150
Intang 42,199 0.163 0.236 0.000 0.058 1.215
PPE 42,199 0.332 0.285 0.003 0.266 1.314
RnD 42,199 0.023 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.234
ADR 42,199 0.022 0.148 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 33,718 0.031 0.386 -2.397 0.080 0.510
ForDisp 33,718 0.009 0.076 0.000 0.002 0.062
Big5 33,718 0.490 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 33,718 2.484 0.872 0.196 2.582 3.690
RoA 33,718 0.115 0.096 0.003 0.090 0.505
Lev 33,718 0.195 0.205 0.000 0.147 0.988
Size 33,718 14.365 2.272 10.316 14.065 20.576
ForOps 33,718 0.372 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 33,718 5.238 17.421 -0.022 0.473 94.075
AggLoss 33,718 0.046 0.209 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 33,718 0.888 0.102 0.527 0.900 1.127
Intang 33,718 0.173 0.239 0.000 0.069 1.229
PPE 33,718 0.336 0.286 0.003 0.268 1.304
RnD 33,718 0.024 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.237
ADR 33,718 0.022 0.147 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 35,441 0.029 0.398 -2.493 0.081 0.531
DiscAcc 35,441 0.000 0.155 -0.620 0.000 0.674
Big5 35,441 0.470 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 35,441 2.496 0.879 0.169 2.609 3.674
RoA 35,441 0.115 0.097 0.003 0.089 0.505
Lev 35,441 0.184 0.205 0.000 0.129 0.978
Size 35,441 13.864 2.266 9.514 13.595 19.975
ForOps 35,441 0.379 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 35,441 4.886 17.379 -0.081 0.501 98.818
AggLoss 35,441 0.060 0.238 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 35,441 0.890 0.104 0.527 0.903 1.152
Intang 35,441 0.171 0.241 0.000 0.064 1.246
PPE 35,441 0.332 0.279 0.006 0.264 1.289
RnD 35,441 0.025 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.244
ADR 35,441 0.019 0.136 0.000 0.000 1.000
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel A, Column (1)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel A, Column (2)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel A, Column (3)
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 27,144 -0.005 0.404 -2.605 0.054 0.486
BidAskSpr 27,144 -4.886 1.156 -7.171 -4.889 -2.236
Big5 27,144 0.325 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 27,144 2.554 0.857 0.212 2.661 3.714
RoA 27,144 0.104 0.092 0.003 0.079 0.502
Lev 27,144 0.173 0.197 0.000 0.118 0.951
Size 27,144 13.995 2.323 9.552 13.734 20.509
ForOps 27,144 0.346 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 27,144 5.158 18.738 -0.041 0.527 109.522
AggLoss 27,144 0.054 0.226 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 27,144 0.899 0.101 0.537 0.912 1.140
Intang 27,144 0.149 0.234 0.000 0.037 1.222
PPE 27,144 0.329 0.285 0.003 0.269 1.315
RnD 27,144 0.019 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.207
ADR 27,144 0.008 0.089 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 16,473 0.002 0.387 -2.366 0.056 0.448
OScore 16,473 1.554 1.135 0.000 1.000 4.000
Big5 16,473 0.366 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 16,473 2.614 0.863 0.246 2.732 3.722
RoA 16,473 0.111 0.092 0.004 0.087 0.499
Lev 16,473 0.181 0.199 0.000 0.131 0.953
Size 16,473 14.226 2.106 10.309 14.016 20.219
ForOps 16,473 0.412 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 16,473 4.043 15.610 -0.053 0.475 88.419
AggLoss 16,473 0.047 0.212 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 16,473 0.891 0.097 0.538 0.905 1.115
Intang 16,473 0.164 0.243 0.000 0.047 1.239
PPE 16,473 0.335 0.281 0.006 0.271 1.308
RnD 16,473 0.023 0.045 0.000 0.001 0.215
ADR 16,473 0.005 0.074 0.000 0.000 1.000
Descriptive Statistics for Panel A, Column (5)
Table 4: Firm-level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel A, Column (4)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Big5 0.005 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.002
[0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.005] [0.012]
Age 0.009** 0.004 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.007
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
RoA 0.744*** 0.702*** 0.665*** 0.872*** 0.743***
[0.095] [0.104] [0.094] [0.138] [0.167]
Lev 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.034 0.020
[0.021] [0.019] [0.022] [0.026] [0.023]
Size 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.003** 0.010*** 0.008***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
ForOps -0.006 0.001 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.009]
BM 0.000*** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AggLoss -0.038 -0.075** -0.020 -0.027 -0.081**
[0.028] [0.031] [0.024] [0.027] [0.033]
CFCnstrnt -0.043* -0.034 -0.169*** -0.029 -0.057
[0.023] [0.027] [0.034] [0.033] [0.069]
Intang -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.045** -0.040***
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.020] [0.015]
PPE 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.073***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.019] [0.020]
RnD 0.155** 0.113* 0.176*** 0.166** 0.122**
[0.064] [0.066] [0.062] [0.070] [0.060]
ADR 0.005 0.001 0.008 -0.023 -0.052**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.023] [0.014] [0.021]
Intercept -0.161*** -0.186*** -0.055 -0.187** -0.213*
[0.053] [0.064] [0.060] [0.078] [0.120]
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Observations 42,199 33,718 35,441 27,144 16,473
Adjusted R-squared 0.081 0.083 0.086 0.085 0.097
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Panel A: Cash ETR Spread
This table presents OLS regression estimations of the information opacity and tax avoidance analysis using firm-level 
annual observations. The dependent variable in all specifications is the cash effective tax rate spread (CETRSpr).  All 
variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year level are reported in
brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model as 
indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. 
Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AUSTRALIA 2,901          2,129          1,735          2,158          961             
AUSTRIA 397             322             43               293             17               
BELGIUM 641             535             39               616             28               
CANADA 3,565          2,793          1,965          1,227          570             
CHILE 356             208             62               22               1                 
DENMARK 822             666             183             790             142             
FINLAND 699             592             300             677             257             
FRANCE 3,202          2,539          782             3,103          607             
GERMANY 2,786          2,184          1,049          2,690          795             
GREECE 436             333             78               24               -              
HUNGARY 174             124             -              98               -              
IRELAND 505             436             6                 334             5                 
ISRAEL 318             190             51               66               8                 
ITALY 1,266          1,033          160             1,250          100             
JAPAN 9,394          6,268          8,524          8,222          5,139          
LUXEMBOURG 80               66               -              48               -              
MEXICO 789             640             13               543             7                 
NETHERLANDS 1,398          1,233          272             1,013          196             
NEW ZEALAND 448             411             27               428             25               
NORWAY 814             686             236             782             175             
POLAND 235             171             21               209             12               
PORTUGAL 275             229             11               242             -              
SOUTH KOREA 1,421          945             2                 1,807          2                 
SPAIN 317             282             16               310             16               
SWEDEN 1,400          1,106          632             885             388             
SWITZERLAND 1,642          1,376          596             1,572          500             
TURKEY 372             277             83               367             61               
UNITED KINGDOM 9,265          5,818          8,162          8,946          4,780          
UNITED STATES 25,734        20,320        18,861        7,307          4,382          
71,652        53,912        43,909        46,029        19,174        
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Country Mix for Panel B
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ETRSpr 71,652 0.112 0.325 -1.124 0.045 1.720
ForErr 71,652 0.048 0.253 0.000 0.005 0.842
Big5 71,652 0.400 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 71,652 2.345 0.874 0.180 2.432 3.640
RoA 71,652 0.039 0.186 -0.806 0.054 0.461
Lev 71,652 0.180 0.211 0.000 0.117 1.081
Size 71,652 13.803 2.542 8.990 13.478 20.595
ForOps 71,652 0.287 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 71,652 6.227 20.708 -0.159 0.540 122.885
AggLoss 71,652 0.228 0.419 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 71,652 0.936 0.150 0.553 0.927 1.595
Intang 71,652 0.151 0.231 0.000 0.047 1.263
PPE 71,652 0.312 0.294 0.002 0.233 1.383
RnD 71,652 0.031 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.412
ADR 71,652 0.024 0.153 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ETRSpr 53,912 0.099 0.313 -1.124 0.039 1.720
ForDisp 53,912 0.020 0.142 0.000 0.003 0.217
Big5 53,912 0.445 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 53,912 2.366 0.888 0.171 2.453 3.662
RoA 53,912 0.058 0.165 -0.627 0.063 0.465
Lev 53,912 0.191 0.212 0.000 0.135 1.086
Size 53,912 14.281 2.433 9.927 13.946 20.771
ForOps 53,912 0.310 0.463 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 53,912 6.251 20.293 -0.068 0.503 117.277
AggLoss 53,912 0.183 0.387 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 53,912 0.921 0.135 0.550 0.919 1.448
Intang 53,912 0.159 0.233 0.000 0.056 1.255
PPE 53,912 0.319 0.294 0.002 0.243 1.349
RnD 53,912 0.031 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.380
ADR 53,912 0.025 0.157 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ETRSpr 43,909 0.099 0.330 -1.124 0.032 1.720
DiscAcc 43,909 -0.001 0.165 -0.707 0.000 0.706
Big5 43,909 0.464 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 43,909 2.435 0.893 0.155 2.536 3.670
RoA 43,909 0.060 0.170 -0.637 0.067 0.485
Lev 43,909 0.182 0.211 0.000 0.122 1.040
Size 43,909 13.638 2.341 9.062 13.391 19.901
ForOps 43,909 0.373 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 43,909 4.856 17.603 -0.199 0.515 103.988
AggLoss 43,909 0.207 0.405 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 43,909 0.918 0.136 0.538 0.917 1.440
Intang 43,909 0.173 0.245 0.000 0.066 1.300
PPE 43,909 0.315 0.277 0.005 0.243 1.274
RnD 43,909 0.033 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.333
ADR 43,909 0.017 0.131 0.000 0.000 1.000
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel B, Column (1)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel B, Column (2)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel B, Column (3)
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ETRSpr 45,582 0.099 0.334 -1.124 0.035 1.720
BidAskSpr 45,582 -4.685 1.182 -7.171 -4.689 -1.927
Big5 45,582 0.280 0.449 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 45,582 2.417 0.879 0.175 2.526 3.690
RoA 45,582 0.041 0.175 -0.736 0.055 0.455
Lev 45,582 0.171 0.202 0.000 0.112 1.023
Size 45,582 13.749 2.525 8.908 13.453 20.676
ForOps 45,582 0.285 0.451 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 45,582 6.182 21.730 -0.153 0.559 133.124
AggLoss 45,582 0.221 0.415 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 45,582 0.934 0.143 0.559 0.928 1.557
Intang 45,582 0.142 0.228 0.000 0.036 1.226
PPE 45,582 0.319 0.294 0.002 0.248 1.403
RnD 45,582 0.026 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.385
ADR 45,582 0.008 0.087 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ETRSpr 19,174 0.074 0.319 -1.124 0.020 1.720
OScore 19,174 1.653 1.169 0.000 2.000 4.000
Big5 19,174 0.372 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 19,174 2.579 0.871 0.257 2.693 3.720
RoA 19,174 0.076 0.140 -0.424 0.073 0.471
Lev 19,174 0.181 0.203 0.000 0.129 0.982
Size 19,174 14.118 2.155 10.026 13.923 20.206
ForOps 19,174 0.411 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 19,174 4.182 16.189 -0.091 0.486 92.559
AggLoss 19,174 0.153 0.360 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 19,174 0.908 0.115 0.551 0.913 1.288
Intang 19,174 0.165 0.243 0.000 0.051 1.268
PPE 19,174 0.325 0.281 0.005 0.257 1.307
RnD 19,174 0.028 0.058 0.000 0.001 0.298
ADR 19,174 0.005 0.072 0.000 0.000 1.000
Descriptive Statistics for Panel B, Column (5)
Table 4: Firm-level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel B, Column (4)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Big5 -0.015** -0.015** -0.017** 0.004 0.000
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010]
Age -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.004* 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
RoA -0.142*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.136*** -0.220***
[0.015] [0.016] [0.020] [0.022] [0.035]
Lev 0.019* 0.022** 0.013 0.013 0.002
[0.010] [0.009] [0.014] [0.012] [0.020]
Size -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
ForOps 0.003 0.005 0.012** 0.005 0.017***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
BM 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AggLoss 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.167***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.007] [0.010] [0.015]
CFCnstrnt -0.045*** -0.052** -0.076*** -0.037** -0.117***
[0.017] [0.020] [0.015] [0.017] [0.027]
Intang -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.031*
[0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.016]
PPE 0.017** 0.013* 0.013* 0.020** 0.014
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014]
RnD 0.153*** 0.187*** 0.212*** 0.109*** 0.258***
[0.025] [0.032] [0.034] [0.039] [0.069]
ADR 0.011 0.005 0.024* 0.004 0.039***
[0.010] [0.012] [0.014] [0.015] [0.005]
Intercept 0.149*** 0.160*** 0.166*** 0.150*** 0.201***
[0.031] [0.034] [0.030] [0.034] [0.040]
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Observations 71,652 53,912 43,909 46,029 19,174
Adjusted R-squared 0.122 0.118 0.112 0.104 0.102
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Panel B: ETR Spread
This table presents OLS regression estimations of the information opacity and tax avoidance analysis using firm-level 
annual observations. The dependent variable in all specifications is the effective tax rate spread (ETRSpr).  All variables 
are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year level are reported in brackets 
below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model as indicated, 
though the coefficients are not reported.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. Significance 
levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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(1) & (2) (3) & (4) (5) & (6) (7) & (8)
AUSTRALIA 1,788               1,445               1,547               1,228               
AUSTRIA 208                 176                 42                   111                 
BELGIUM 220                 193                 34                   217                 
CANADA 1,660               1,377               1,428               610                 
CHILE 156                 83                   58                   10                   
DENMARK 543                 444                 158                 514                 
FINLAND 514                 456                 237                 496                 
FRANCE 842                 705                 688                 821                 
GERMANY 1,125               940                 842                 1,093               
GREECE 319                 256                 73                   4                     
HUNGARY 94                   78                   -                  52                   
IRELAND 357                 316                 6                     227                 
ISRAEL 106                 68                   35                   32                   
ITALY 294                 265                 148                 236                 
JAPAN 7,650               5,406               7,542               6,946               
LUXEMBOURG 48                   37                   -                  30                   
MEXICO 31                   26                   11                   16                   
NETHERLANDS 625                 558                 225                 474                 
NEW ZEALAND 364                 343                 26                   343                 
NORWAY 453                 391                 177                 436                 
POLAND 139                 121                 20                   132                 
PORTUGAL 192                 161                 11                   158                 
SOUTH KOREA 11                   13                   2                     9                     
SPAIN 202                 182                 13                   197                 
SWEDEN 829                 681                 501                 584                 
SWITZERLAND 860                 769                 520                 826                 
TURKEY 250                 194                 76                   262                 
UNITED KINGDOM 6,653               4,665               6,444               6,347               
UNITED STATES 15,663             13,366             14,577             4,732               
42,196             33,715             35,441             27,143             
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Country Mix for Panel C
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 42,196 0.025 0.398 -2.578 0.078 0.533
ETRSpr 42,196 0.040 0.258 -1.099 0.017 1.065
ForErr 42,196 0.019 0.145 0.000 0.003 0.176
Big5 42,196 0.447 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 42,196 2.480 0.860 0.203 2.576 3.671
RoA 42,196 0.111 0.096 0.003 0.085 0.505
Lev 42,196 0.186 0.204 0.000 0.133 0.976
Size 42,196 14.019 2.349 9.625 13.715 20.424
ForOps 42,196 0.349 0.477 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 42,196 5.476 18.552 -0.051 0.509 104.961
AggLoss 42,196 0.055 0.228 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 42,196 0.893 0.104 0.527 0.905 1.150
Intang 42,196 0.163 0.236 0.000 0.058 1.215
PPE 42,196 0.332 0.285 0.003 0.266 1.314
RnD 42,196 0.023 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.234
ADR 42,196 0.022 0.148 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 33,715 0.031 0.386 -2.397 0.080 0.509
ETRSpr 33,715 0.039 0.247 -0.997 0.019 0.971
ForDisp 33,715 0.009 0.076 0.000 0.002 0.062
Big5 33,715 0.490 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 33,715 2.484 0.872 0.196 2.582 3.690
RoA 33,715 0.115 0.096 0.003 0.090 0.505
Lev 33,715 0.195 0.205 0.000 0.147 0.988
Size 33,715 14.365 2.272 10.316 14.065 20.576
ForOps 33,715 0.372 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 33,715 5.237 17.421 -0.022 0.473 94.075
AggLoss 33,715 0.046 0.209 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 33,715 0.888 0.102 0.527 0.900 1.127
Intang 33,715 0.173 0.239 0.000 0.069 1.229
PPE 33,715 0.336 0.286 0.003 0.269 1.304
RnD 33,715 0.024 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.237
ADR 33,715 0.022 0.147 0.000 0.000 1.000
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Summary Statistics for Panel C, Column (1)
Summary Statistics for Panel C, Column (2)
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 35,441 0.029 0.398 -2.493 0.081 0.531
ETRSpr 35,441 0.038 0.261 -1.106 0.015 1.101
DiscAcc 35,441 0.000 0.155 -0.620 0.000 0.674
Big5 35,441 0.470 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 35,441 2.496 0.879 0.169 2.609 3.674
RoA 35,441 0.115 0.097 0.003 0.089 0.505
Lev 35,441 0.184 0.205 0.000 0.129 0.978
Size 35,441 13.864 2.266 9.514 13.595 19.975
ForOps 35,441 0.379 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 35,441 4.886 17.379 -0.081 0.501 98.818
AggLoss 35,441 0.060 0.238 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 35,441 0.890 0.104 0.527 0.903 1.152
Intang 35,441 0.171 0.241 0.000 0.064 1.246
PPE 35,441 0.332 0.279 0.006 0.264 1.289
RnD 35,441 0.025 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.244
ADR 35,441 0.019 0.136 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 27,143 -0.005 0.404 -2.605 0.054 0.486
ETRSpr 27,143 0.030 0.261 -1.124 0.010 1.054
BidAskSpr 27,143 -4.886 1.156 -7.171 -4.889 -2.236
Big5 27,143 0.325 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 27,143 2.554 0.857 0.212 2.661 3.714
RoA 27,143 0.104 0.092 0.003 0.079 0.502
Lev 27,143 0.173 0.197 0.000 0.118 0.951
Size 27,143 13.995 2.323 9.552 13.734 20.509
ForOps 27,143 0.346 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 27,143 5.158 18.738 -0.041 0.527 109.522
AggLoss 27,143 0.054 0.226 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 27,143 0.899 0.101 0.537 0.912 1.140
Intang 27,143 0.149 0.234 0.000 0.037 1.222
PPE 27,143 0.329 0.285 0.003 0.269 1.315
RnD 27,143 0.019 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.207
ADR 27,143 0.008 0.089 0.000 0.000 1.000
Summary Statistics for Panel C, Column (4)
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Summary Statistics for Panel C, Column (3)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)









Big5 0.005 -0.019** 0.011 -0.013 0.002 -0.021** 0.003 -0.005
[0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.008] [0.005] [0.011]
Age 0.009** 0.005** 0.004 0.003 0.010*** 0.006** 0.015*** 0.008***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
RoA 0.744*** -0.020 0.702*** -0.024 0.665*** -0.009 0.872*** 0.030
[0.095] [0.042] [0.104] [0.049] [0.094] [0.040] [0.138] [0.062]
Lev 0.057*** 0.024* 0.055*** 0.022* 0.056*** 0.028* 0.034 0.017
[0.021] [0.013] [0.019] [0.012] [0.022] [0.016] [0.026] [0.018]
Size 0.004*** -0.006*** 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.003** -0.007*** 0.010*** -0.003*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
ForOps -0.006 -0.004 0.001 -0.000 -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.005
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.007]
BM 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AggLoss -0.038 -0.080*** -0.075** -0.092*** -0.020 -0.072*** -0.027 -0.081***
[0.028] [0.020] [0.031] [0.021] [0.024] [0.018] [0.027] [0.026]
CFCnstrnt -0.043* 0.022 -0.034 0.022 -0.169*** 0.026 -0.029 0.049**
[0.023] [0.018] [0.027] [0.019] [0.034] [0.016] [0.033] [0.023]
Intang -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.045** -0.038**
[0.012] [0.017] [0.011] [0.017] [0.011] [0.015] [0.020] [0.018]
PPE 0.059*** 0.044*** 0.056*** 0.034*** 0.063*** 0.045*** 0.068*** 0.059***
[0.012] [0.009] [0.012] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.019] [0.011]
RnD 0.155** 0.451*** 0.113* 0.411*** 0.176*** 0.466*** 0.166** 0.460***
[0.064] [0.074] [0.066] [0.068] [0.062] [0.075] [0.070] [0.097]
ADR 0.005 0.019 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.024* -0.023 0.028***
[0.019] [0.014] [0.019] [0.013] [0.023] [0.014] [0.014] [0.007]
Intercept -0.160*** 0.059** -0.183*** 0.052 -0.055 0.051* -0.204*** 0.017
[0.053] [0.030] [0.064] [0.034] [0.060] [0.027] [0.079] [0.036]
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Observations 42,196 42,196 33,715 33,715 35,441 35,441 27,143 27,143
Adjusted R-squared 0.081 0.058 0.083 0.059 0.086 0.062 0.085 0.057
Table 4: Firm-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Panel C: Common CETR & ETR Sample
This table presents OLS regression estimations of the information opacity and tax avoidance analysis using firm-level annual 
observations for a sample which includes the requisite data for calculating both the CETRSpr and ETRSpr.  All variables are as 
defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year level are reported in brackets below the 
coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model as indicated, though the coefficients 
are not reported.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests 
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUSTRALIA 879                    879                    877                    879                    
AUSTRIA 17                     17                     11                     17                     
BELGIUM 24                     24                     24                     24                     
CANADA 415                    415                    415                    415                    
CHILE 1                       1                       1                       1                       
DENMARK 123                    123                    123                    123                    
FINLAND 212                    212                    212                    212                    
FRANCE 549                    549                    559                    549                    
GERMANY 659                    659                    664                    659                    
IRELAND 5                       5                       5                       5                       
ISRAEL 6                       6                       6                       6                       
ITALY 96                     96                     -                    96                     
JAPAN 4,687                 4,687                 4,687                 4,687                 
MEXICO 6                       6                       6                       6                       
NETHERLANDS 166                    166                    158                    166                    
NEW ZEALAND 24                     24                     24                     24                     
NORWAY 137                    137                    138                    137                    
POLAND -                    -                    11                     11                     
SOUTH KOREA 2                       2                       -                    2                       
SPAIN 13                     13                     13                     13                     
SWEDEN 306                    306                    309                    306                    
SWITZERLAND 452                    452                    448                    452                    
TURKEY 56                     56                     -                    56                     
UNITED KINGDOM 4,134                 4,134                 4,131                 4,134                 
UNITED STATES 3,493                 3,493                 -                    3,493                 
16,462               16,462               12,822               16,473               
Table 5: Country-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance
Country Mix for Panel A
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 16,462 0.002 0.387 -2.366 0.056 0.448
OScore 16,462 1.554 1.135 0.000 1.000 4.000
Governance 16,462 83.709 9.015 65.580 82.610 96.740
Big5 16,462 0.366 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 16,462 2.615 0.863 0.246 2.733 3.722
RoA 16,462 0.111 0.092 0.004 0.087 0.499
Lev 16,462 0.181 0.199 0.000 0.131 0.953
Size 16,462 14.227 2.107 10.309 14.019 20.219
ForOps 16,462 0.412 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 16,462 4.046 15.615 -0.053 0.476 88.419
AggLoss 16,462 0.047 0.212 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 16,462 0.891 0.096 0.538 0.905 1.114
Intang 16,462 0.164 0.243 0.000 0.047 1.239
PPE 16,462 0.335 0.281 0.006 0.271 1.308
RnD 16,462 0.023 0.045 0.000 0.001 0.215
ADR 16,462 0.005 0.074 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 16,462 0.002 0.387 -2.366 0.056 0.448
OScore 16,462 1.554 1.135 0.000 1.000 4.000
Disclosure 16,462 96.817 6.083 76.450 100.000 100.000
Big5 16,462 0.366 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 16,462 2.615 0.863 0.246 2.733 3.722
RoA 16,462 0.111 0.092 0.004 0.087 0.499
Lev 16,462 0.181 0.199 0.000 0.131 0.953
Size 16,462 14.227 2.107 10.309 14.019 20.219
ForOps 16,462 0.412 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 16,462 4.046 15.615 -0.053 0.476 88.419
AggLoss 16,462 0.047 0.212 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 16,462 0.891 0.096 0.538 0.905 1.114
Intang 16,462 0.164 0.243 0.000 0.047 1.239
PPE 16,462 0.335 0.281 0.006 0.271 1.308
RnD 16,462 0.023 0.045 0.000 0.001 0.215
ADR 16,462 0.005 0.074 0.000 0.000 1.000
Table 5: Country-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel A, Column (1)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel A, Column (2)
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 12,822 -0.022 0.383 -2.315 0.036 0.430
OScore 12,822 1.757 1.124 0.000 2.000 4.000
MediaPen 12,822 91.255 4.654 78.000 92.000 97.000
Big5 12,822 0.225 0.417 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 12,822 2.639 0.859 0.268 2.774 3.738
RoA 12,822 0.107 0.090 0.004 0.083 0.475
Lev 12,822 0.168 0.186 0.000 0.121 0.866
Size 12,822 14.117 2.038 10.246 13.961 19.664
ForOps 12,822 0.408 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 12,822 3.884 15.943 -0.028 0.511 93.850
AggLoss 12,822 0.049 0.215 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 12,822 0.898 0.096 0.548 0.910 1.121
Intang 12,822 0.135 0.228 0.000 0.027 1.161
PPE 12,822 0.344 0.276 0.005 0.290 1.290
RnD 12,822 0.021 0.042 0.000 0.001 0.197
ADR 12,822 0.007 0.083 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CETRSpr 16,473 0.002 0.387 -2.366 0.056 0.448
OScore 16,473 1.554 1.135 0.000 1.000 4.000
PostIFRS 16,473 0.205 0.403 0.000 0.000 1.000
Big5 16,473 0.366 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 16,473 2.614 0.863 0.246 2.732 3.722
RoA 16,473 0.111 0.092 0.004 0.087 0.499
Lev 16,473 0.181 0.199 0.000 0.131 0.953
Size 16,473 14.226 2.106 10.309 14.016 20.219
ForOps 16,473 0.412 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 16,473 4.043 15.610 -0.053 0.475 88.419
AggLoss 16,473 0.047 0.212 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 16,473 0.891 0.097 0.538 0.905 1.115
Intang 16,473 0.164 0.243 0.000 0.047 1.239
PPE 16,473 0.335 0.281 0.006 0.271 1.308
RnD 16,473 0.023 0.045 0.000 0.001 0.215
ADR 16,473 0.005 0.074 0.000 0.000 1.000
Descriptive Statistics for Panel A, Column (4)
Table 5: Country-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel A, Column (3)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)









OScore 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
Big5 0.030** 0.013 0.014 0.025
[0.014] [0.011] [0.017] [0.016]
Age 0.008 0.005 0.013*** 0.004
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
RoA 0.762*** 0.744*** 0.835*** 0.753***
[0.173] [0.176] [0.190] [0.174]
Lev 0.043* 0.029 0.033 0.040*
[0.023] [0.024] [0.029] [0.023]
Size 0.006** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
ForOps -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010
[0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010]
BM 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AggLoss -0.075** -0.076** -0.052* -0.074**
[0.032] [0.032] [0.028] [0.032]
CFCnstrnt -0.099 -0.090 -0.025 -0.106*
[0.063] [0.066] [0.061] [0.063]
Intang 0.005 -0.007 -0.037* 0.006
[0.015] [0.017] [0.020] [0.018]
PPE 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.062*** 0.071***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
RnD 0.156** 0.154** 0.111* 0.163***
[0.062] [0.060] [0.063] [0.062]
ADR -0.062*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.056***
[0.017] [0.014] [0.017] [0.014]
Intercept 0.100 0.249** 0.282*** -0.138
[0.158] [0.108] [0.109] [0.108]
Fixed Effects I Y I Y I Y I Y
Observations 16,462 16,462 12,822 16,473
Adjusted R-squared 0.090 0.090 0.093 0.089
Table 5: Country-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Panel A: Cash ETR Spread
This table presents OLS regression estimations of country-level information opacity measures and 
firm-level tax avoidance analysis. The dependent variable in all specifications is the cash effective 
tax rate spread (CETRSpr).  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors
clustered at both the firm and year level are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, 
industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model as indicated, though the coefficients are 
not reported.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. Significance levels are
based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
69
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUSTRALIA 961                    961                    958                    961                    
AUSTRIA 17                     17                     11                     17                     
BELGIUM 28                     28                     28                     28                     
CANADA 570                    570                    565                    570                    
CHILE 1                       1                       1                       1                       
DENMARK 142                    142                    142                    142                    
FINLAND 257                    257                    257                    257                    
FRANCE 607                    607                    622                    607                    
GERMANY 795                    795                    800                    795                    
IRELAND 5                       5                       5                       5                       
ISRAEL 8                       8                       6                       8                       
ITALY 100                    100                    -                    100                    
JAPAN 5,139                 5,139                 5,139                 5,139                 
MEXICO 7                       7                       7                       7                       
NETHERLANDS 196                    196                    186                    196                    
NEW ZEALAND 25                     25                     25                     25                     
NORWAY 175                    175                    176                    175                    
POLAND -                    -                    12                     12                     
SOUTH KOREA 2                       2                       -                    2                       
SPAIN 16                     16                     16                     16                     
SWEDEN 388                    388                    391                    388                    
SWITZERLAND 500                    500                    492                    500                    
TURKEY 61                     61                     -                    61                     
UNITED KINGDOM 4,780                 4,780                 4,778                 4,780                 
UNITED STATES 4,382                 4,382                 -                    4,382                 
19,162               19,162               14,617               19,174               
Table 5: Country-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Country Mix for Panel B
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ETRSpr 19,162 0.074 0.319 -1.124 0.020 1.720
OScore 19,162 1.653 1.169 0.000 2.000 4.000
Governance 19,162 83.515 9.101 65.580 82.610 96.740
Big5 19,162 0.372 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 19,162 2.580 0.871 0.257 2.694 3.720
RoA 19,162 0.076 0.141 -0.424 0.073 0.471
Lev 19,162 0.181 0.203 0.000 0.129 0.982
Size 19,162 14.119 2.155 10.026 13.924 20.206
ForOps 19,162 0.411 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 19,162 4.185 16.193 -0.091 0.487 92.559
AggLoss 19,162 0.153 0.360 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 19,162 0.908 0.115 0.551 0.913 1.288
Intang 19,162 0.165 0.243 0.000 0.051 1.268
PPE 19,162 0.325 0.281 0.005 0.257 1.307
RnD 19,162 0.028 0.058 0.000 0.001 0.298
ADR 19,162 0.005 0.072 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ETRSpr 19,162 0.074 0.319 -1.124 0.020 1.720
OScore 19,162 1.653 1.169 0.000 2.000 4.000
Disclosure 19,162 96.597 6.182 76.450 100.000 100.000
Big5 19,162 0.372 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 19,162 2.580 0.871 0.257 2.694 3.720
RoA 19,162 0.076 0.141 -0.424 0.073 0.471
Lev 19,162 0.181 0.203 0.000 0.129 0.982
Size 19,162 14.119 2.155 10.026 13.924 20.206
ForOps 19,162 0.411 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 19,162 4.185 16.193 -0.091 0.487 92.559
AggLoss 19,162 0.153 0.360 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 19,162 0.908 0.115 0.551 0.913 1.288
Intang 19,162 0.165 0.243 0.000 0.051 1.268
PPE 19,162 0.325 0.281 0.005 0.257 1.307
RnD 19,162 0.028 0.058 0.000 0.001 0.298
ADR 19,162 0.005 0.072 0.000 0.000 1.000
Table 5: Country-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel B, Column (1)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel B, Column (2)
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ETRSpr 14,617 0.051 0.304 -1.124 0.007 1.605
OScore 14,617 1.864 1.150 0.000 2.000 4.000
MediaPen 14,617 91.130 4.750 78.000 92.000 97.000
Big5 14,617 0.223 0.417 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 14,617 2.612 0.870 0.272 2.750 3.738
RoA 14,617 0.078 0.131 -0.388 0.071 0.461
Lev 14,617 0.166 0.186 0.000 0.119 0.866
Size 14,617 14.027 2.080 9.966 13.890 19.652
ForOps 14,617 0.407 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 14,617 3.971 16.428 -0.047 0.522 98.622
AggLoss 14,617 0.139 0.346 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 14,617 0.911 0.111 0.555 0.917 1.273
Intang 14,617 0.136 0.228 0.000 0.028 1.173
PPE 14,617 0.337 0.277 0.005 0.280 1.303
RnD 14,617 0.024 0.052 0.000 0.001 0.276
ADR 14,617 0.007 0.082 0.000 0.000 1.000
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
ETRSpr 19,174 0.074 0.319 -1.124 0.020 1.720
OScore 19,174 1.653 1.169 0.000 2.000 4.000
PostIFRS 19,174 0.197 0.398 0.000 0.000 1.000
Big5 19,174 0.372 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age 19,174 2.579 0.871 0.257 2.693 3.720
RoA 19,174 0.076 0.140 -0.424 0.073 0.471
Lev 19,174 0.181 0.203 0.000 0.129 0.982
Size 19,174 14.118 2.155 10.026 13.923 20.206
ForOps 19,174 0.411 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
BM 19,174 4.182 16.189 -0.091 0.486 92.559
AggLoss 19,174 0.153 0.360 0.000 0.000 1.000
CFCnstrnt 19,174 0.908 0.115 0.551 0.913 1.288
Intang 19,174 0.165 0.243 0.000 0.051 1.268
PPE 19,174 0.325 0.281 0.005 0.257 1.307
RnD 19,174 0.028 0.058 0.000 0.001 0.298
ADR 19,174 0.005 0.072 0.000 0.000 1.000
Descriptive Statistics for Panel B, Column (4)
Table 5: Country-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Panel B, Column (3)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)









OScore 0.005 0.007** 0.005 0.006**
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Big5 0.024*** 0.008 0.001 0.022**
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.010]
Age -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
RoA -0.225*** -0.227*** -0.222*** -0.227***
[0.032] [0.034] [0.039] [0.032]
Lev 0.020 0.007 0.019 0.018
[0.024] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023]
Size -0.006*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
ForOps 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.008 0.013**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
BM 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AggLoss 0.177*** 0.173*** 0.162*** 0.177***
[0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016]
CFCnstrnt -0.154*** -0.147*** -0.101*** -0.159***
[0.023] [0.025] [0.028] [0.023]
Intang 0.004 -0.005 -0.020 0.003
[0.017] [0.016] [0.021] [0.016]
PPE 0.019 0.021 0.026* 0.019
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
RnD 0.295*** 0.281*** 0.113* 0.294***
[0.072] [0.068] [0.068] [0.073]
ADR 0.019 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.022
[0.017] [0.011] [0.010] [0.015]
Intercept 0.407*** 0.589*** 0.685*** 0.225***
[0.063] [0.057] [0.084] [0.030]
Fixed Effects I Y I Y I Y I Y
Observations 19,162 19,162 14,617 19,174
Adjusted R-squared 0.095 0.097 0.076 0.093
Table 5: Country-Level Information Opacity and Tax Avoidance (continued)
Panel B: ETR Spread
This table presents OLS regression estimations of country-level information opacity measures and 
firm-level tax avoidance analysis. The dependent variable in all specifications is the effective tax rate 
spread (ETRSpr).  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at 
both the firm and year level are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, industry, 
and year fixed effects are included in each model as indicated, though the coefficients are not 
reported.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. Significance levels are based 
upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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Sca, respectively).  C
olum
ns (5) and (6) report robustness results w
ith a random
 
selection of 11 countries as adopters (as opposed to the 11 countries selected per T
able 6).  C
olum
ns (7) and (8) report robustness results w
ith a random
ly selected year as the m
andatory IFR
S 
adoption year.  C
olum
ns (9) and (10) report robustness results for tests that exclude the U
nited States from
 the control sam
ple.  A
ll variables are as defined in the A
ppendix.  R
obust standard 
errors clustered at both the firm
 and year level are reported in brackets below
 the coefficients.  A
dditionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each m
odel as indicated, 
though the coefficients are not reported.  A
ll continuous variables are w
insorized at the 1 percent level. Significance levels are based upon tw
o-sided t-tests and are indicated as follow
s: * p<0.1,  
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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(1) (2) (3)
Variables CETRSpr CETRSca CETRSpr










Big5 0.073** -0.220* 0.074**
[0.036] [0.121] [0.035]
Age 0.010 -0.020 0.010
[0.016] [0.045] [0.016]
RoA 0.615*** -1.854*** 0.612***
[0.034] [0.112] [0.034]
Lev 0.004 -0.034 0.003
[0.057] [0.160] [0.058]
Size 0.013** -0.037*** 0.012**
[0.005] [0.013] [0.005]
ForOps -0.002 0.012 -0.002
[0.011] [0.034] [0.012]
BM -0.000** 0.001* -0.000**
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
AggLoss -0.108** 0.355** -0.108**
[0.049] [0.149] [0.048]
CFCnstrnt -0.130** 0.333** -0.132***
[0.051] [0.133] [0.049]
Intang 0.017 -0.039 0.019
[0.036] [0.099] [0.035]
PPE 0.009 -0.047 0.009
[0.039] [0.103] [0.038]
RnD -0.018 -0.069 -0.011
[0.197] [0.558] [0.197]
ADR -0.037 0.119 -0.044
[0.052] [0.178] [0.051]
Intercept -0.196*** 1.624*** -0.199***
[0.037] [0.110] [0.036]
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y
Observations 3,002 3,002 3,002
Adjusted R-squared 0.054 0.058 0.054
Table 8: IFRS Adoption, Information Opacity, and Tax Avoidance
This table presents OLS regression estimations of the effect of information opacity on tax 
avoidance immediately before and after mandatory IFRS adoption using firm-level annual 
observations.  The dependent variable of each model is labeled at the column head and 
includes either the cash effective tax rate spread or ratio (CETRSpr and CETRSca, 
respectively).  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors
clustered at the firm and year level are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  
Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model as 
indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1 percent level. Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated 
as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables CETRSpr CETRSca ETRSpr ETRSca
IT Enforcement -0.099*** 0.293*** -0.036*** 0.068**
[0.037] [0.108] [0.013] [0.034]
Big5 0.005 -0.010 -0.015** 0.025
[0.010] [0.029] [0.006] [0.016]
Age 0.009*** -0.025** -0.001 0.003
[0.004] [0.010] [0.002] [0.006]
RoA 0.752*** -2.173*** -0.145*** 0.400***
[0.094] [0.262] [0.015] [0.042]
Lev 0.058*** -0.168*** 0.021** -0.048*
[0.020] [0.060] [0.011] [0.028]
Size 0.004*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.014***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.003]
ForOps -0.006 0.020 0.003 -0.005
[0.006] [0.016] [0.004] [0.012]
BM 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000* -0.001**
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
AggLoss -0.033 0.107 0.170*** -0.476***
[0.028] [0.078] [0.008] [0.023]
CFCnstrnt -0.040* 0.087 -0.045*** 0.110**
[0.022] [0.059] [0.017] [0.045]
Intang -0.048*** 0.146*** -0.039*** 0.102***
[0.012] [0.035] [0.006] [0.018]
PPE 0.059*** -0.181*** 0.016** -0.056***
[0.012] [0.035] [0.007] [0.018]
RnD 0.151** -0.416** 0.140*** -0.313***
[0.064] [0.181] [0.025] [0.075]
ADR 0.004 -0.024 0.013 -0.015
[0.020] [0.062] [0.009] [0.027]
Intercept -0.082 1.243*** 0.174*** 0.513***
[0.051] [0.141] [0.035] [0.102]
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Observations 42,714 42,714 73,325 73,325
Adjusted R-squared 0.080 0.078 0.121 0.110
Table 9: Tax Avoidance and Insider Trading Enforcement as Shock to Information Opacity
This table presents OLS regression estimations of directional analyses of information opacity, and tax avoidance 
using firm-level annual observations.  The dependent variable of each model is labeled at the column head and 
includes either the cash effective tax rate spread or ratio (CETRSpr and CETRSca, respectively) in Columns (1) and 
(2) and the reported effective tax rate spread or ratio (ETRSpr and ETRSca, respectively) in Columns (3) and (4).  
All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year level are reported 
in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model 
as indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. 
Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables CETRSpr CETRSca CETRSpr CETRSca
OScore 0.009** -0.027** 0.007 -0.024*









Big5 -0.001 0.005 0.036* -0.084*
[0.012] [0.035] [0.021] [0.051]
Age 0.006 -0.015 0.006 -0.016
[0.005] [0.014] [0.005] [0.013]
RoA 0.749*** -2.199*** 0.754*** -2.196***
[0.176] [0.499] [0.176] [0.494]
Lev 0.021 -0.062 0.039* -0.106
[0.024] [0.071] [0.022] [0.066]
Size 0.007** -0.021** 0.006*** -0.018**
[0.003] [0.009] [0.002] [0.007]
ForOps -0.005 0.021 -0.004 0.020
[0.009] [0.026] [0.009] [0.024]
BM 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
AggLoss -0.079** 0.233** -0.073** 0.218**
[0.034] [0.091] [0.032] [0.086]
CFCnstrnt -0.062 0.116 -0.091 0.189
[0.069] [0.191] [0.064] [0.181]
Intang -0.046*** 0.138*** -0.003 0.029
[0.017] [0.050] [0.018] [0.051]
PPE 0.067*** -0.215*** 0.074*** -0.233***
[0.021] [0.061] [0.020] [0.057]
RnD 0.117* -0.408** 0.154** -0.484***
[0.066] [0.180] [0.064] [0.177]
ADR -0.058** 0.150** -0.080*** 0.196***
[0.024] [0.067] [0.017] [0.044]
Intercept -0.179 1.575*** -0.131 1.432***
[0.126] [0.357] [0.107] [0.308]
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y I Y I Y
Observations 15,788 15,788 16,473 16,473
Adjusted R-squared 0.098 0.093 0.088 0.085
Table 10: Rent Extraction, Information Opacity, and Tax Avoidance
This table presents OLS regression estimations of the opportunities for rent extraction, information 
opacity, and tax avoidance analysis using firm-level annual observations. The dependent variable of 
each model is labeled at the column head and includes either the cash effective tax rate spread or 
ratio (CETRSpr and CETRSca, respectively).  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors clustered at both the firm and year level are reported in brackets below the 
coefficients.  Additionally, country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model as 
indicated (with country fixed effects omitted in some cases), though the coefficients are not reported.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. Significance levels are based upon 
two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











CSTR 2.861** 0.332 1.679 -0.391 -2.513***
[1.269] [1.002] [1.439] [0.967] [0.926]
BookTaxConf 1.418*** 1.399*** 1.120*** 1.093*** 0.500
[0.302] [0.302] [0.316] [0.345] [0.365]
Worldwide 0.258* 0.655*** 0.183 0.593*** 0.638***
[0.147] [0.148] [0.286] [0.165] [0.172]
EarnVol -0.886** -1.832*** -2.258*** -1.392*** -1.174***
[0.399] [0.324] [0.336] [0.358] [0.345]
CivCom -1.022*** -0.318 -0.415 -0.352 0.124
[0.351] [0.290] [0.391] [0.357] [0.377]
AntiDirRights -0.202** -0.086 0.082 -0.048 0.064
[0.092] [0.074] [0.074] [0.098] [0.102]
OwnCon 0.063 0.146 -0.216 0.215 0.612
[0.468] [0.457] [0.417] [0.574] [0.607]
PBOpp_C -0.543*** -0.481*** -0.190 -0.388*** -0.248
[0.146] [0.125] [0.156] [0.139] [0.151]
Intercept 0.392 0.320 0.542 3.113*** 3.573***
[0.891] [0.783] [2.179] [0.460] [0.417]
Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Observations 248 248 199 248 248
Adjusted R-squared 0.413 0.440 0.587 0.266 0.328
Table 11: Country-Level Information Opacity and Aggregate Tax Avoidance
This table presents OLS regression estimations of country-level information opacity measures and country-level 
corporate tax revenues. The dependent variable in all specifications is the corporate tax revenues collected by the 
jurisdiction for the year as a percentage of GDP for the year.  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, year fixed effects are included in the first 
three models as indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests 
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s: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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Fama-Macbeth 3 Oscore PCA 3 PCA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)











Big5 -0.003 0.004 0.178*** 0.010 0.003 0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.038] [0.014] [0.012] [0.014]
Age 0.013*** -0.011 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005
[0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
RoA 0.916*** 0.003 1.009*** 0.667*** 0.681*** 0.631***
[0.164] [0.036] [0.211] [0.108] [0.161] [0.106]
Lev -0.004 0.013 0.101*** 0.051*** 0.020 0.053***
[0.029] [0.018] [0.029] [0.020] [0.023] [0.020]
Size 0.011*** 0.000 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
ForOps -0.004 0.006 -0.028** -0.001 -0.006 -0.001
[0.009] [0.010] [0.012] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006]
BM 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AggLoss -0.077*** -0.268*** 0.001 -0.067** -0.076** -0.064**
[0.029] [0.058] [0.029] [0.028] [0.033] [0.028]
CFCnstrnt -0.018 0.031 -0.024 -0.069* -0.151** -0.130***
[0.066] [0.030] [0.077] [0.039] [0.075] [0.040]
Intang -0.009 -0.009 -0.060 -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.047***
[0.024] [0.015] [0.046] [0.012] [0.015] [0.012]
PPE 0.102*** 0.085*** 0.080*** 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.058***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.017] [0.012] [0.019] [0.012]
RnD 0.047 0.316*** -0.247 0.137** 0.121** 0.137**
[0.090] [0.074] [0.212] [0.065] [0.061] [0.064]
ADR -0.047** -0.048* -0.056 0.007 -0.055*** 0.007
[0.022] [0.026] [0.043] [0.024] [0.020] [0.024]
Intercept -0.416*** 0.030 -0.356** -0.188** -0.095 -0.111
[0.113] [0.059] [0.123] [0.075] [0.115] [0.077]
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Observations 12,179 14,875 18,590 27,658 16,473 27,658
Adjusted R-squared 0.100 0.105 0.081 0.087 0.099 0.089
Table 13: Additional Robustness
Lead/Lag Analysis
This table presents OLS regression estimations of the information opacity and tax avoidance analysis using firm-level annual observations. 
The dependent variable in all specifications except Column (2) is the cash effective tax rate spread (CETRSpr).  For Column (2) the 
dependent variable is the lagged CETRSpr.  All other variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Columns (1) and (2) perform a lead-lag 
analysis, Column (3) presents the results for Fama-Macbeth (yearly cross-sectional) regressions, Column (4) excludes the Bid-Ask Spread 
from the calculation of OScore (with a new range of 0 to 3), Column (5) calculates OScore as a principal-component analysis of all four 
measures of opacity, and Column (6) calculated OScore using a principal-component anlaysis for only the three measures of opacity used in 
Column (4).  Robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year level are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, 
country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model as indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Big5 -0.013 -0.003 -0.016 -0.004 0.010
[0.012] [0.013] [0.016] [0.013] [0.018]
Age 0.013** 0.008 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.013***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
RoA 0.874*** 0.832*** 0.753*** 0.920*** 0.847***
[0.128] [0.142] [0.139] [0.141] [0.182]
Lev 0.064** 0.054* 0.060** 0.043 0.023
[0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.030] [0.027]
Size 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.007*** 0.008**
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004]
ForOps -0.005 -0.000 -0.006 -0.011 -0.008
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011]
BM 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AggLoss -0.017 -0.065** 0.013 -0.011 -0.057**
[0.028] [0.030] [0.022] [0.027] [0.029]
CFCnstrnt -0.010 0.007 -0.217*** 0.003 -0.010
[0.036] [0.041] [0.066] [0.036] [0.063]
Intang -0.067*** -0.054*** -0.072*** -0.059*** -0.048**
[0.020] [0.019] [0.017] [0.022] [0.020]
PPE 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.059*** 0.063***
[0.017] [0.015] [0.014] [0.019] [0.021]
RnD 0.095 0.019 0.165** 0.097 0.095
[0.084] [0.086] [0.082] [0.076] [0.071]
ADR 0.026 0.023 0.031 0.028 -0.063***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.026] [0.031] [0.022]
Intercept -0.108 -0.135 0.098 -0.274*** -0.277**
[0.070] [0.084] [0.075] [0.077] [0.121]
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Observations 26,535 20,351 20,864 22,643 12,980
Adjusted R-squared 0.086 0.091 0.092 0.086 0.096
Table 14: Firm-Level Excluding United States
Panel A: Cash ETR Spread
This table presents OLS regression estimations of the information opacity and tax avoidance analysis using firm-level 
annual observations including all countries except the United States of America. The dependent variable in all 
specifications is the cash effective tax rate spread (CETRSpr).  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors clustered at both the firm and year level are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, 
country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model as indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and 
are indicated as follows: * p<0.1,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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Big5 -0.006 -0.011** -0.005 0.001 -0.006
[0.004] [0.005] [0.009] [0.004] [0.012]
Age 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.004* 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004]
RoA -0.146*** -0.179*** -0.167*** -0.137*** -0.217***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.031] [0.026] [0.040]
Lev 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.015
[0.008] [0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.021]
Size -0.004*** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.004*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
ForOps 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.010
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
BM 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AggLoss 0.160*** 0.152*** 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.161***
[0.010] [0.015] [0.010] [0.012] [0.017]
CFCnstrnt -0.029 -0.029 -0.042** -0.020 -0.094***
[0.021] [0.026] [0.020] [0.020] [0.027]
Intang -0.034*** -0.029* -0.025* -0.036*** -0.025
[0.012] [0.016] [0.015] [0.012] [0.023]
PPE 0.023** 0.019** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.021
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.014]
RnD 0.039 0.077* 0.035 0.025 0.108
[0.034] [0.045] [0.041] [0.036] [0.068]
ADR 0.003 0.003 0.018 0.004 0.044***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.015] [0.013] [0.010]
Intercept 0.127*** 0.146*** 0.170*** 0.138*** 0.192***
[0.037] [0.038] [0.034] [0.036] [0.043]
Fixed Effects C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y C I Y
Observations 45,918 33,592 25,048 38,722 14,792
Adjusted R-squared 0.089 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.078
Table 14: Firm-Level Excluding United States (continued)
Panel B: ETR Spread
This table presents OLS regression estimations of the information opacity and tax avoidance analysis using firm-level 
annual observations including all countries except the United States of America. The dependent variable in all 
specifications is the effective tax rate spread (ETRSpr).  All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  Robust standard 
errors clustered at both the firm and year level are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Additionally, country, 
industry, and year fixed effects are included in each model as indicated, though the coefficients are not reported.  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. Significance levels are based upon two-sided t-tests and are 








































































































































































































































































































































s both the corporate statutory tax rate (C
ST
R
) and the personal statutory tax rate (PST
R
) for the three years surrounding the adoption 
of  IFR
S for those countries w
hich adopted IFR
S. 
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